

# *Five Excursions into Free Association, or Just Take the A Train<sup>1</sup>*

DEBORAH P. BRITZMAN  
*York University*

*Research no longer merely seeks successful comprehension. It returns to things it cannot understand. It measures by fortifying its needs and methods.*

– de Certeau, *The Writing of History* <sup>2</sup>

## I

“What am I supposed to do?” the analysand asks. “Just say whatever comes to mind,” the analyst replies. So begins the strangely frustrating psychoanalytic request Freud called “the fundamental rule”: free association.<sup>3</sup> Rarely can a rule be so indiscriminating, although it is precisely through indiscretion that this rule miniaturizes the story of psychoanalysis; its interpretation makes psychoanalysis psychoanalytic. Perhaps for this reason the rule is very difficult to accept, unless, of course, it can dawn on the speaker that she or he is free to freely associate with her or his conflicts. Let us note there is nothing here to solve. Instead, this experience of conflict allows for all that will follow, not just in the analytic setting, although it is there where free association may matter most, but also something like free association can take residence in the pedagogical imagination, where there, too, the fragility of language gives notice to the difficulties of freely associating and the utter importance of doing just that.

The astounding paradox at the center of free association is frustrating. The more one tries to let whatever is on one’s mind come out into words,

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the fewer words there seem to be, even as the obstacles that make up one's mind tumble out in a sentence like: "I have nothing to say." Free association evokes the very trouble at the heart of the analytic encounter: how does one work through the ways the self cannot freely associate? How does one encounter a self that is made from intellectual inhibition, censorship, projection, self-deception, confusion, and rigid life narratives in self/other relations? More simply, what does narrative mean for learning to live, and how does one come to care about narrative through something so careless as free association?

This rule of free association allows for fundamental differences. First, it distinguishes psychoanalysis from other therapeutic practices and other theories of the mind by its emphasis on the unconscious, its irruptions, its susceptibility to experiences not consciously noticed, and its inclination for repression. Second, in free association, language resembles a photographic negative. This is the difference within language: there is negation, disavowal, slips of the tongue, forgetting details, and undoing what has already happened. Here, meaning unhinges itself for desire. It is as if in free association desire suddenly slips into the back door of language. This arrival is without apperency. How easily this language can dissolve into too many meanings, and so escape the speaker, go up in smoke. Even descriptions of free association as a practice and theory suggest the difficulty of putting this experience to words. This, too, is another version of psychoanalytic conflict between theory and practice.

Third, when utterances change, so too does listening and the strictures of interpretation. The underside of language can be heard as if the aim of words is to set themselves free from their objects. Then, the literal becomes literary. There can be parallel realities, conflictive chronologies, whole cities of narratives, all occupying the same space. This archive is dedicated to the transference. We are approaching a fourth difference: free association creates, between the analyst and the analysand, new editions of attunement and resistance. Fifth, in this strange libidinal economy the meanings and doings of free association are also deeply resisted. We do not give up our points so easily, nor can we simply let go of the meanings we inherit or wish for. Yet the aimlessness and, at times, emptiness of meaning that is also free association can feel as if the speaker, too, is lost in words. Free association can then become a feeling state, venturing beyond the mind set.

What begins as a technique of therapy, or, as Kristeva calls it, "a speech therapy," soon becomes a theory of language.<sup>4</sup> We are entering the talking cure but also any form of practice, including our own pedagogical ones, that require a faith in narrative. And this theory gestures to the difficulties of practice, indeed to the ways in which practice must resist its own theory in order to even encounter itself. In clinical writing on free association, be-

ginning with Freud's descriptions, the resistance is emphasized, followed by the difficulties of respecting this fundamental rule, then comes the obstacle, both social and psychical to its maintenance, and finally, the problem of listening to all this. Free association, then, is both a particular narrative and the resistance to making narrative particular. That is, free association simultaneously narrates the difficulties of and obstacles to a narration that both structures and contains experience. Words fail in so many ways, even as they may urge us along to notice just that. Curiously, it is language that disrupts the unity of the Kantian "I think that accompanies all of my representations."<sup>5</sup> There is the negation, the "I would have never thought of that," the "I" that cannot be accompanied, that has no representatives.

Consider then, the "I think that accompanies all of my education." Does the field of education have a fundamental rule, an orientation to its practices that makes education qualify as education? How does a technique of education become a theory of learning and so make for a clinical knowledge of teaching? We educators do have a sense of the ways education resists learning and how our techniques contribute to this peculiar conflict. We are indeed familiar with the student's frustration when, after receiving an assignment, she or he asks: "What am I supposed to do?" And we can say here as well, "what am I supposed to do with this free association?" Many educators may notice the flummox, particularly if the point of their assignment is to make room for autonomy, to create the conditions involved for the writer to decide what it is to choose to do something at all. This choice cannot be taught. As with free association, this assignment is just a condition for learning. If we respond to this student, "just say whatever is on your mind," we, too, invite the stirring of free association even as we understand that the very structure of education invokes the dependency, compliance, and apathy that renders association so heavy and unfree. Education, too, must play this guessing game until anticipations are no longer the goals. If, as de Certeau suggests, we create a research that no longer seeks its own comprehension and so has the courage to return to what is not understood, this very *Unheimlich* return, as both psychoanalysis and education know, animates the old anxious question it is meant to transform: Just what should I return to? Just what am I supposed to do?

## II

Many of Freud's most cogent descriptions of the method of free association are found in his papers on technique written in the early history of psychoanalysis.<sup>6</sup> One of Freud's (1913) most poignant descriptions begins with advice as to what the analyst may say to the analysand. In the beginning there is an unusual conversation:

What you tell me must differ in one respect from an ordinary conversation. Ordinarily you rightly try to keep a connecting thread running through your remarks and you exclude any intrusive ideas that may occur to you ... but in this case you must proceed differently. You will notice that as you relate things various thoughts will occur to you which you would like to put aside on the grounds of certain criticism and objections.... You must never give in to these criticisms ... indeed, you must say it precisely *because* you feel an aversion to doing so.... (135–136)<sup>7</sup>

Here we have an invitation to conflict, even if avoidance seems easier. These various thoughts, Freud implies, must be put into words, otherwise the criticisms, objections, and so the prohibitions make discourse autistic. In a more positive sense, Freud concludes his advice to the imagined analysand with a moving metaphor: “Act as though, for instance, you were a traveler sitting next to the window of a railway carriage and describing to someone inside the carriage the changing views which you see outside” (135). Essentially, free association is a train of thought, a way of training thought to derail itself.

Free association is a rule that stretches language to its furthest outpost of meanings; it means to relax language from the grip of censorship and criticism and unmoor it from the entanglement of endless clarifications, justifications, projections, and rationalizations that conscious intentions call upon to keep meaning still. But it is also an encouragement to the waking subject to experience the dreamlike qualities of having language, to associate with one’s dissociations, to encounter again the strange trance-like sensation one has when trying to narrate a dream. This mesmerizing talk will meander. Suddenly the speaker will find herself where least expected, maybe mired in unacceptable fantasies of love and hate, desires, erotic wishes. Theoretically, that should not matter: speaker and listener may be unencumbered by rules of relevance, sense, courtesy, agendas, objectives, goals and yes, even the Foucaultian confessional. A new quality of association can be made from this disassociation. More than that: in the intimacy of the analytic setting, there is no consequence for saying whatever comes to mind, except for the consequence of being subject to meaning. Here is a research that returns to what it cannot understand. This meandering may permit a new and flexible sense of psychological knowledge, epistemology, and what we take as outside reality.

When Freud (1912) first called free association the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis, he also described “the transference-resistance” (107): that which makes free association free is extremely difficult to maintain because of association. To involve oneself in free association means to give up, however briefly, one’s sense of reality in the world, one’s sense of actuality and its limits, and one’s sense that language can be controlled, or serve as the proving ground for Kantian unity. To participate in free association is to

give oneself over to the Eros of language. And just as the analysand is asked to hold in abeyance her self judgements, or encounter this berating as a stranger, she must also stop worrying about what the analyst who listens thinks about all of that. It is to enter language and thinking, nothing more than that. But there is something more, for it is difficult to leave behind a certain history of education, a history of second guessing, of projection, of worrying without knowledge what precisely the other will think. There is the school, the home, even the neighborhood. There is the association and so the transference resistance.

Not only then is this fundamental rule extremely difficult to follow, it will also invoke its own mode of resistance. It is easier, Freud suggests, for the analysand to worry about how the other will understand. It is easier to fall in love with the analyst, it is easier to throw one's hands up and blame the analysis, than it is to participate in one's own analysis. There will be, there must be deflection. Here is Freud's cautionary remark in his 1912 paper, "The Dynamics of Transference: "This struggle between the doctor and the patient, between intellect and instinctual life, and between understanding and seeking to act, is played out almost exclusively in the phenomenon of transference" (108).<sup>8</sup> And yet, this deflection is psychoanalysis as well; without it, we would be nothing.

### III

In that strange address that is free association, there is always the other. When Freud spoke of free association, he also made a note on interpretation suggesting that the analyst's work is "to draw conclusions from the expressed ideas of the person" (208).<sup>9</sup> These "conclusions" must not be the moralists and must not be tied to any party agendas, political platforms, parental or societal authority. They cannot save the analysand from embarrassment or hurt feelings. Rather, the interpretations, that is to say, the analyst's associations, are meant to provoke, animate, and perhaps help the analysand work through the resistance and the transference.

When Christopher Bollas (1999) asked provocatively about the goal of psychoanalysis, what it does that distinguishes its methods for everything else, and so how is it that psychoanalysis becomes psychoanalysis, he returned to this original request of Freud's: that the analytic sessions are structured by the analysand's free association.<sup>10</sup> And Bollas, too, recounted all that stands in the way of free association, with the paradoxical suggestion that what stands in its way frees one to consider constraints: "Free association was never intended to provide ideal talk in which the observer noted from the train all the sights seen on the journey.... In theory one should be able to ride this train without hindrance. In practice it would generate and

deploy the unconscious conflicts of the mind" (65). In free association, theory and practice shall be at odds and through this conflict—neither theory alone nor practice alone—insight would make its way slowly, hesitantly, shyly.

A new discourse shall emerge and for Bollas, free association opens the crypt of Western epistemology from the inside out with the consequence of freely encountering the contradictions and conflicts previously buried through idealization. Then, Bollas suggests, when something happens to language, sociality, and thinking, as it may in free association, something as well happens to larger conceptualizations of epistemology: "To ask Western man to discover truth by abandoning the effort to find it and adopting instead the leisurely task of simply stating what crosses the mind moment to moment is to undermine the entire structure of Western epistemology" (63).

Truth, it will turn out, is found not in proof of reality, in the critique of pure reason, or in scientific control. Instead it will be through the accident, through the evidence of things unseen and discarded that free association permits: truth will slowly find its way from the mine field of "unreal reality" to the significance of psychical life.<sup>11</sup> Here, truth undermines values of mastery and control and the accompanying desire to evacuate subjectivity from reason. This intimate truth resides in the farthest thing from one's mind, in the crevice of "I would have never thought of that." Truth is constructed from the fault lines of meaning, along the edges of symbolic equivalences that cannot quite meet, and during times when smoking a cigar is more than, well.... The train derails precisely because of language and so of aporia. It is not just that the subject is split: indeed, the subject splits and in splitting, affects herself. In free association, development is uneven, non-continuous, and subject to regression. There are vicissitudes, wild thoughts, sentence fragments, mishearings.

Epistemology in psychoanalytic dialogue, Bollas (2000) will say in his study of hysteria, becomes "an on-going experimentation with the arts and crafts of ontology" (81).<sup>12</sup> And in referencing ontology, we are back to our beginnings, both maternal and paternal. In free association, these different orders associate, come together in new ways:

The patient allowed simply to speak what came to mind seemed almost a maternal defiance of the demands to get to the truth; if so, then it only borrowed from the psychic reality that no truth could ever be imposed, but rather had to be created.... The patient and analyst might conjure the medium of mother and small child—a world of overlapping reveries—but in this case the father would intervene with his discovery of important communications, lucid lessons, and the patient's hidden conflicts. (112)

To freely associate with these images, one must freely associate with psychical reality, not for instance with sentences from sociology, where mommy is weak and daddy is strong. We are, after all, trying to come as close as we can

to another reality, the one that exerts a force before it can be known, the reality of phantasy. We need not we read Bollas defensively, as proffering statements of overvaluation and derision. Rather, these reveries, themselves the ground for “lucid lessons,” can be encountered as difference itself, as containing an unknowable realm of truth, namely that one is born, that one has parents, and from these social facts, come a truth the facts cannot anticipate.

Free association comes as a surprise. François Roustang (1996) names this twisted language—“un-speech [*déparole*]” (25).<sup>13</sup> “In everyday life, speech is supposedly designed to communicate and transmit information, but also, obviously, to avoid transmitting information” (25). And so Roustang begins with a central paradox of language, that communication itself avoids communication, that communication severs associations. This deflection is sustained, many note, in our information society. We have so many ways of not saying what we are saying that it takes a particular kind of listening to hear the void. We might hear free association as a protest against the information society, a way beyond what Kristeva (2000) calls, a patrilineal subject, “armed for discourse with only a remote control.”<sup>14</sup> Free association may be a refuge from the barrage of twenty-four hour news that has nothing to say, from the stay-in-touch-demand of e-mail, and from the litter of discarded information on that superhighway. Free association, Roustang continues, is autonomous from intention, even as it leads back to the self in startling ways. “Un-speech is similar to delirium, in that it is speech that has been undone, a drifting speech that is no longer concerned with being directed at someone or inscribed in a social relationship in of an action or plan” (26). And here is where the difficulties emerge: how does one give up a plan? And also, why should a plan be given up at all?

If free association requires us to say anything, whatever comes to mind, and places this under the sign of “freedom,” there is also the association, or the address. Again, in free association, there is always the other. Christopher Bollas (2002) maintains that free association is “a new technique for thinking” (34).<sup>15</sup> What invokes thinking, Bollas may imply, is the thought of the unfamiliar. Thinking works as an apparatus of association. It does something to thoughts, to language, to the thinker.<sup>16</sup> Prior to its act, the destination of thinking is not apparent; plans are of no help in this regard; even worse, plans may actually work to help us miss the experience. Eventually, Bollas suggests, free association narrates a story of sorts, but “a story revealed not between the lines, but in the chain of ideas within the lines.” (4).<sup>17</sup> This is close to how Freud (1913) describes the analyst’s reading of the analysand’s secrete wishes, “between the lines of his complaints and the story of his illness” (140).<sup>18</sup> And it is not such a leap to de Certeau’s (1986) more contemporary description of Freud’s writings: “It allows us to consider any narrative as a relationship between a structure and some events,”

but also between “the symptoms of the illness and “the history of the suffering” (20–21). Indeed, free association, as in narrative itself, is both structure and event, symptom and history.

Free association reveals the trouble with language that we tend to place in a parenthesis to even speak at all. There is difference within, a necessary mismatch or conflict between the word and the urge, between the affect and the idea, between consciousness and the unconscious. Here and there language cannot serve to punctuate experience; it is experience. And as an experience, it can be missed, lost, and sometimes refound. When speaking of the analyst’s interpretation of the analysand’s utterances, Bollas (2002) puts the dilemma this way: “Often the psychoanalyst will find that when he or she is making a comment the patient appears to have drifted off. The analyst discovers that his or her interpretation is not used for its apparent accuracy, but as a kind of evocative form: because the analyst is talking, curiously the patient is free not to listen! But in not listening, the patient seems intra-psychically directed towards another interpretation” (42). Let us note two curiosities. First, we are free not to listen. Second, even when we are not listening, there is association and interpretation. If free association can lead to interpretation, interpretation makes for more free associations.

Freud believed that free association was the means for cure. Eventually, the patient comes to what is on her mind, allows her language its unruly qualities, finds her significance in the most insignificant places, and becomes more curious toward her own psychological reality. Freud’s Hungarian colleague, Sándor Ferenczi, thought that we are cured when we can freely associate. Again, we are entering the psychoanalytic realm of the “talking cure,” although how this talk works will be the subject of deep controversy, then and now. We can say that free association is a very strange use of language and perhaps agree with Karen Horney’s assessment that there is no other word for it.<sup>19</sup> “What we actually mean by free association,” writes Horney, “is the purposelessness of mental productions. There is no immediate purpose other than this: letting things emerge” (37).

## IV

Let us take a very short excursion into the psychoanalytic archive and consider the scenes behind the theoretical papers. They associate friendship with the discovery of method, technical advice made after painful mistakes, even misadventures. Very early in the voluminous three-volume correspondence between Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi, which spanned the years from 1908–1933, an excited and maybe even manic Ferenczi writes to Freud about this key discovery of free association. It seems he could barely contain himself, so involved was he in learning the new method of psycho-



analysis and so interested in his own analysis and its progress. It may be important to know that Freud was forty-three years old when he met the twenty-six-year-old Ferenczi, that Ferenczi idealized Freud and loved him deeply, but that over the course of their association, wished Freud could be more than his friend. He spoke of this something more as a mutual analysis, and indeed, much later Ferenczi would try this in his clinical practice. For a brief time, Freud was the analyst of Ferenczi and the long correspondence documents, informally, what one scholar has called their “psychoanalytic misadventures” and the painful exchanges of transference. Indeed, in the letters, Freud tries to warn Ferenczi of “the danger of personal estrangement brought about by the analysis” (#393, 482). It is best, Freud seems to be saying, if one is analyzed by a stranger. Friends may be too subject to rescue fantasies, personal investments in the cure, even in becoming a role model or ego ideal. Moreover, Freud recommended that analysts take the stance of abstinence and neutrality and so allow the analytic setting to be a playground of transference. Ferenczi, however, preferred not to make a distinction between his personal and professional life; he desired mutual analysis, believed in kisses, and saw in this practice the potential for a rare and beautiful intimacy. By the way, Ferenczi is often called “the tender analyst.”<sup>20</sup>

But let us return to that twenty-six-year-old Ferenczi who had just returned to his home in Budapest from his visit to Freud’s Vienna. On February 5, 1910, Ferenczi writes a long letter and says in part the following:

Once society has gone beyond the infantile, then hitherto completely unimagined possibilities for social and political life are opened up. Just think what it would mean if one *could tell everyone the truth*, one’s father, teacher, neighbor, and even the king. All fabricated, imposed authority would go to the devil—what is *rightful* would remain natural. The eradication of lies from private and public life would necessarily *have to* bring about better conditions; if reason and not dogmas (to which I add the word “morality”) prevail, a more purposeful, less costly, and in every respect more economical reconciliation of individual interests and the common good would ensue....

Here in Budapest I found everything the way it was, only I myself seemed to have changed, talking things out has eradicated the last traces of neuroses, and I sense—in place of the earlier inclination toward inactivity—a kind of urge to something. (#109, 131–132)<sup>21</sup>

This “urge to do something” consisted in beginning the work of founding the Budapest Psychoanalytic Society in 1913. And yet, in hindsight, the urge did not last as Ferenczi hoped; he experienced long depressions, writing blocks, and terrible indecisiveness in love relations. All of this was exacerbated by Freud’s bad advice to Ferenczi on a matter of love. For the rest of his passionate correspondence with Freud, his hope that “the last trances of neuroses” have been eradicated does not bear out. Indeed, the correspon-

dence is a veritable testimony to Ferenczi's greater and deeper disappointment that he and Freud could not achieve a mutual free association and equality in the matter of love. If something resists the capacity to occupy that place Ferenczi thought of as "beyond the infantile," when everyone can just tell the truth, there is also that utterly necessary tension, that might be thought of as the infantile, between an inclination toward inactivity and an urge to do something. This, too, is free association.

## V

In Ferenczi's excited letters to Freud, if something can happen to language, if language can try to get as close as it can to the affectations that make it so necessary, then something can happen in the person who speaks. One of the roots of free association emerges from a literary method found in advice manuals written to burgeoning writers. Freud (1920) recounts this relation in his short paper, "A note on the prehistory of the technique of analysis."<sup>22</sup> Free association, or something like it, such as "automatic writing," was a method employed by mystics, poets and writers. The surrealists were quite taken with this method. Rousseau's *Confessions* hitched the autobiographic impulse and so the autobiography to it.<sup>23</sup> The literary modernists and their invention of streams of consciousness made scandalous art of it. The surrealists like André Breton and Salvador Dali tried to visualize it through the strangeness of a hyper-reality that Freud called "the interpretation of dreams."<sup>24</sup> We can say as well that this automatic writing is the Ouija Board of discourse, the desire for discourse to be telepathic and to actually give us a message. So come. Place your hands on the magic pointer, move right into language, and let it speak. Freud found this mesmerizing history of automatic writing in Havelock Ellis's short essay that argues psychoanalysis is an art not a science.<sup>25</sup> That, of course, is a good long argument relevant to education as well. For our purposes of pre-history, Freud borrows from Ellis a passage of a short essay of advice to new writers that Ferenczi also read. "The art of becoming an original writer in three days," by one Ludwig Börne, written in 1823 tells us:

Take a few sheets of paper and for three days on end write down, without fabrication or hypocrisy, everything that comes into your head. Write down what you think of yourself, of your wife, of the Turkish War, of Goethe ... of your superiors—and when three days have passed you will be quite out of your senses with astonishment at the new and unheard-of thoughts you have had. This is the art of becoming an original writer in three days. (265)

To become an original, one must tell the truth, say whatever is on one's mind, write through censorship, through conventional morality, through cultural politeness, and through worries about what someone else will think

of it. Indeed, go out of your senses, jump that train, and try to say everything. Some of this advice is given to contemporary students in creative writing classes, and it seems quite easy to follow with modern technology. With the computer, for instance, we certainly work at breakneck speed, perhaps even become mesmerized by watching language race across the screen. And yet in our own educational archive, this automatic technique is not equivalent to what we call cognitive mapping, brainstorming, or webbing, for with the latter methods, we are not to complain about authority, write down what we think of the teacher, have unheard-of thoughts. The lost art that Börne describes so manically, and that a chagrined Freud and Ferenczi may have joked about, that prehistory of thought is not regained from filling the page, from having one's brain stormed. Automatic writing is not free association, really. It is just an interesting metaphor. It may be just preliminary labor because the analysis and interpretation of this automatic talk, this un-speech, this free association leads to the very conflicts the discourse covers over. Here we meet once again the idea of Karen Horney who writes, "Of course, free association is never free." And, "it does not work magic. It would be wrong to expect that as soon as rational control is released all that we are afraid of or despise in ourselves will be revealed. We may be fairly sure that no more will appear this way than we are able to stand" (106).<sup>26</sup>

Here, too, is where free association meets the resistance, perhaps where we have to stop listening. In free association we try to meet, most accidentally, most sublimely, and without discrimination, the otherness within. Yet we need the other to do this, the other who, unlike a sheet of paper, can freely associate with us. We are called back to the association. That is to say, we are closest to our unconscious when we notice disassociation, when we are not listening, when we say the opposite of what we mean, when we turn language inside out, when our grammar collapses under the weight of our desire, and when we have no regard for staying on the topic. We are closet to our unconscious when it can be witnessed by another, when the other puts us on notice, gives us back our conclusions so that we can redo them again. Christopher Bollas (2002) writes, "The curious laboratory of psychoanalysis allows us to see how people think unconsciously" (52).<sup>27</sup> We are no longer looking out of the train window to describe all of what can be observed. Instead, we are trying to look inside this train of thought. If we could make something of a curious laboratory in education, how then would we answer that question, "What am I supposed to do?" Would we, like Ferenczi, only tell the truth? Would we take the route of Karen Horney and simply suggest the curious laboratory of education creates only what it can stand? Or maybe, the question, what becomes of our research, can return to what it does not understand. Then, perhaps the truth straddles the conflict of a theory that both urges this research and acknowledges the difficulty of freely associating with that.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> A shorter version of this paper was given in Toronto at the 2002 meeting of the Canadian Societies for the Studies of Education, "New Vocabularies For Education." I thank Dennis Sumara for organizing this session and inviting my participation.

<sup>2</sup> Michel de Certeau. *The Writing of History*. p. 39. Trans. Tom Conley. NY: Columbia, 1988.

<sup>3</sup> The editors of *The Standard Edition* suggest that Freud's view of free association as "the fundamental rule" first appeared in his early papers on technique.

<sup>4</sup> Julia Kristeva. 1995. *New Maladies of the Soul*. Trans. Ross Guberman. NY: Columbia University Press, 105.

<sup>5</sup> Adorno's (2001) lectures on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* continually repeat this Kantian mantra of the 'I think that accompanies all of my representations.' It is a phrase that gets at a constitutive problem of reason, what Adorno called "a mania for foundations." (52); where thinking and unity are thought to be the same, that is consciousness is thought to give unity to experience. This raises the problem of where knowledge originates, a question reason can ask but cannot finally answer in any way that sustains the unity of the "I think." See, Theodor Adorno, *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. Edited by Rolf Tiedemann. Translated by Rodney Livingstone. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001.

<sup>6</sup> Freud's six papers on technique were written between 1911–1915, and comprise a series of recommendations to practitioners of psychoanalysis. These recommendations include: dream interpretation, thinking about the transference, beginning psychoanalysis, the difficulties of working through, and then further recommendations on the transference. The complex personal issues that precipitated Freud's discussions on these techniques can be found in his vast correspondence. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to detail the psychoanalytic breakdowns that give rise to Freud's recommendations, it is worth noting that Freud hints at the personal conflicts the psychoanalytic practice stirs for the analyst in his correspondence with Ferenczi who seemed to be breaking all the rules, except, of course, the fundamental one.

<sup>7</sup> Sigmund Freud, "On beginning the treatment" 1913, *SE* 12, 123–144.

<sup>8</sup> Sigmund Freud, "The Dynamics of Transference 1912." *SE* 12, 97–108.

<sup>9</sup> Sigmund Freud, "On Psycho-analysis 1913 [1911]." *SE* 12, 205–212.

<sup>10</sup> Christopher Bollas, *The Mystery of Things*. London: Routledge, 1999.

<sup>11</sup> This phrasing of "unreal reality" comes from the writing of Melanie Klein. She was trying to describe unconscious phantasy and how omnipotence allows phantasy its imposing qualities, making reality a projection.

<sup>12</sup> Christopher Bollas, *Hysteria*. London: Routledge Press, 2000.

<sup>13</sup> François Roustand, *How to make a paranoid laugh: Or, what is psychoanalysis?*. Translated by Anne C. Vila. Philadelphia: University of Penn. Press, 2000.

<sup>14</sup> Julia Kristeva. *The Sense and Non-Sense of Revolt: The Limits and Powers of Psychoanalysis*, Vol.2. Translated by Jeanine Herman. NY: Columbia University Press, 2000.

<sup>15</sup> Christopher Bollas. *Free Association*. London: Icon Books, 2002.

<sup>16</sup> Wilfred Bion begins with these views, see for example Bion's *Taming Wild Thoughts*, edited by Francesca Bion. London: Karnac Books, 1977.

<sup>17</sup> Michel de Certeau. *Heterologies: Discourse on the Other*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.

<sup>18</sup> In that same essay, "On Beginning the Treatment" Freud also urges analytic modesty: "Even in the later stages of analysis one must be careful not to give a patient the solu-

tion of a symptom or the translation of a wish until he is already so close to it that he has only one short step to make in order to get hold of the explanation for himself" (140). See Freud, "On Beginning the Treatment (Further Recommendations on the technique of psycho-analysis, I, 1913)." SE 12, pp. 121–144).

<sup>19</sup> Karen Horney. *Final Lectures*. NY: Norton Press, 1991, p.36.

<sup>20</sup> See Sandor Ferenczi: *The Psychotherapist of Tenderness and Passion*. Arnold Wm Rachman. Northvale: Jason Aronson, 1997.

<sup>21</sup> *The Correspondence of Sigmund Freud and Sándor Ferenczi, Vol. I 1908–1914*. Ed. Eva Barbant, Ernst Falzeder, and Patrizia Giampieri-Deutsch. Trans. Peter Hoffer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.

<sup>22</sup> Sigmund Freud, "A Note on the Prehistory of the Technique of Analysis (1920)." SE XVIII (1920–1922), 263–265.

<sup>23</sup> See Tzvetan Todorov (20002) *Fragile Happiness: An Essay on Rousseau*. Translated by John T. Scott and Robert D. Zaretsky. University Park: Penn State Press., p. 43.

<sup>24</sup> Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams, 1900. Standard Edition, Vol.IV*.

<sup>25</sup> While it is well beyond this discussion, it is worth it to note that Sigmund Freud had a rather uneven professional relationship with Havlock Ellis. In 1934, when Freud was seventy-eight, one of Ellis's graduate students, a twenty-eight-year-old Joseph Wortis entered a short analysis with Freud. Wortis wrote a short description of his analysis with Freud and at times, the description reads like a battle of the titans, where Wortis seems caught between Freud and Ellis, specifically on the question of whether psychoanalysis is a science or art. See Joseph Wortis, *My Analysis with Freud*. London: Jason Aronson, 1994.

<sup>26</sup> Karen Horney. *Self-Analysis*. NY: WW Norton, 1942.

<sup>27</sup> Christopher Bollas, *Free Association*. London: Icon Books, 2002.