Feeling in crisis: Vicissitudes of response in experiments with Global Justice Education

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“All you need,” Jaime Escalante tells his working class, Latino and Chicano students, “is ganas—desire!” Reconstructing the struggles of a Bolivian American IT worker-turned-high school teacher to transform the racialized inequality of his community one successful student at a time, Stand and Deliver (1988) is one of the few dramatizations of critical pedagogy I feel comfortable screening in a preservice course on social justice education. The film speaks to the Latin American Freirean politics and histories anchoring a movement that has informed a broad spectrum of anticolonial, sexual liberation, equity-, minority rights-, and social justice-seeking pedagogies. In his advocating ganas, Escalante encourages not only his students but also critical educators to draw strength from a form of passion and social commitment to fuel their work in classrooms and communities. Amongst other role models, Escalante’s example has been inspirational to me for thinking about a number of issues: the nexus of affective engagement, a critical analysis of systemic discrimination, reflexive self-implication and pedagogies committed to social change.
Amongst the many constructive critiques of critical pedagogy, the question of desire and passion in activist- or social change-oriented teaching is opened up by psychoanalytically-informed research into learning as a psychic, and not purely cognitive, event. Key thinkers such as Deborah Britzman (1998, 2009) and Roger Simon (2005; Simon et al., 2000) have launched discussions in curriculum studies of the ways that studying examples of social injustice is not an affectively neutral experience. Rather, encounters with representations of incommensurable social injustice and historical trauma make demands upon learners that tap into longer psychic and social histories of conflict and attendant breakdowns in understanding (Pitt & Britzman, 2003, p. 756). Using the term “difficult knowledge” to frame their study of the ways libidinal histories and the dynamics they return (fantasies, disavowals and defences) animate and ripple through the teaching/learning encounter, Pitt and Britzman (2003) urge educators to consider “what makes knowledge difficult in teaching and learning” (pp. 757-758)?

In this paper I am interested in the qualities of activist, social justice education that render teaching/learning both paradoxical and difficult. I ask how our inherited models and theories of learning and teaching for social change can curb our vigilance vis-à-vis the ways libidinal dynamics organize our curriculum as affective wish and our pedagogy as affective defense. I focus specifically on the qualities of global justice education (GJE)—the ethical and political stakes of this project, the theories of learning, and the pedagogical strategies and discourses of moral development it inherits—that render learning, teaching, and learning to teach (none of which are discrete) affectively and ethically fraught.

It is through the example of a specific preservice teacher education course in GJE that this paper takes up the challenge to think through the pedagogical conditions within which learners might experiment with the affective and ethical relations of knowing, within which we are
implicated and passionately invested as part of a pedagogical process of ethical subject formation (Britzman, 2000, p. 29).

The paper examines samples of student writing from a preservice course on social and global justice education at the small liberal arts university where I teach. This is a course designed to engage future teachers in considering the inequitable global distribution of precarity and recognizability (Butler, 2009) within contemporary contexts of neoliberal globalization and war, and to support them in developing forms of reflexivity and agency as educators that seek consolation neither in redemptive nor despairing narratives but that work through the volatile psychic and discursive dynamics of learning. In the writing samples, students reflect on the challenges they faced encountering representations of social devastation and breakdown, as well as economic exploitation and exclusion, experienced on a massive scale within the increasingly polarized world order. The focus of the exercise, however, is for students to reflect on their experience of creating and facilitating curriculum within which their peers might encounter such difficult knowledge. My reading of this student writing pursues several questions. Firstly, what can students’ narrations of teaching social justice tell us about what is difficult in studying/teaching the devastation of the contemporary militarized, imperial global order in which we are profoundly implicated as citizens in the global North? This question comprises subquestions concerning what is difficult about making meaning from representations of grave injustice, including designing curriculum that stages such representations, as well as what is difficult in responding pedagogically to students’ unpredictable responses to such encounters. Secondly, what can student narrations of teaching social justice tell me about what is difficult in global justice teacher education, specifically the wishes, the anxieties and discursive foreclosures underpinning my own conduct of it in this course?
These questions are nested within a larger interest in the pedagogical conditions under which students’ encounters with the difficult knowledge of social injustice might be reframed, sustained and become significant to their frameworks for acting in the world (Simon, 2011). In this paper I am interested in the ways beginning teachers struggle to respond to and take responsibility for knowledge of the ravages of neo-imperial capitalist globalization, knowledge that is Other to the frames through which they apprehend themselves and their relation to the world around them. I am interested in their struggles to make sense of this knowledge, in particular, pedagogical sense. This is the labour of “learning twice” which Anna Freud identified in teaching and, as Britzman and Pitt (2007), remind us, it is the labour of learning from one’s own responses and those of others in the face of incommensurable knowledge (p. 117). It is the task of making insight from one’s encountering oneself through the otherness of knowledge as learner and teacher (Britzman & Pitt, 2007, p. 118; see below).

Difficult qualities of Social Justice Education

Examining the contentious history of reception of the *Diary of Anne Frank*, Britzman draws our attention to a crucial dilemma in educational projects committed to understanding and transforming the roots of social violence. The stakes of education that addresses “genocide, ethnic hatred, and experiences of despair and helplessness” are so high as to render intolerable an understanding of learning as a psychic event and the recognition of resistance as inherent and, indeed, “the grounds of knowledge itself” (Britzman, 1998, p. 118). Social justice education can be understood as burdened by the ethical mandate with which it is charged, that is, the hope that studying injustice might serve as a vehicle within a larger process of social change aimed to ensure such injustice occurs “never again”.

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“Never again” is not only an ethical mandate; it can also be seen, as Britzman (p. 118) argues, as an expression of the teacher’s unconscious wishes in reaction to the weight of inheriting such a mandate. The absolute certainty of such a commitment might be considered, that is, in relation to teachers’ own psychic struggles to refuse, master or work through the anxieties returned by the examples of social trauma they have planned to teach.

What is difficult about such knowledge for Pitt and Britzman (2003), is the experience of “encountering the self through the otherness of knowledge” (p. 755). For this paper, I have found Simon’s (2011) gloss of this concept most useful as he applies it to the challenges of curating exhibitions of historical trauma:

[W]hat is difficult about historical knowledge associated with violence and conflict is not just that the materials exhibited elicit anger, horror and disgust, and judgments that past actions were shameful and unjust. More to the point, what defines the difficult in the encounters offered by exhibitions addressing violence and conflict is what happens when one comes face to face with the task of inheriting the troubling consequences of ‘the otherness of knowledge’. Difficulty happens when one’s conceptual frameworks, emotional attachments, and conscious and unconscious desires delimit one’s ability to settle the meaning of past events.

Ellsworth (2005) explains this another way: “In order to learn something new, as in previously unthought, we must lose that part of ourselves whose identity depends on not thinking that thought … that depends on not being the kind of person who entertains such thoughts or understands such thoughts” (p. 89).

Britzman speculates on the possible libidinal dynamics of the struggle to implicate oneself in knowledge that presses so heavily even
as it eludes symbolization. In her study of the contentious history of Anne Frank’s diary, she suggests (1998) that the stakes in this difficult inheritance turn on “the interminable work of making relation to loss” (pp. 118-20). The loss experienced when facing knowledge of mass injustice and suffering, she argues, can comprise different objects: a loss of agency (a sense of helplessness); a loss of meaning (the insufficiency of one’s current frames to resolve one’s affective turmoil into meanings that might restore the integrity of the disrupted self); and the “loss of the idea of the social bond” and the trust in a human community in which one might claim meaningful membership (Britzman, 2000, pp. 28, 33).

The response to an experience of loss tends to be structured by ambivalence, she argues. In the case of the diary, readers may oscillate between readings of hope and those of despair, between an idealized identification with a plucky, heroic Anne as a role model of hope to emulate today and a melancholic anguish at her irreversible death (Britzman, 2000, p. 34).

Herein lies Britzman’s concern about pedagogies that seek to distill lessons of hope from an example such as genocide: how, she asks (2000), does a pedagogical focus on hope and heroes function as consolation, a refusal of implication or defence against an educator’s mourning the loss of agency to prevent such suffering (pp. 33-35)? How does curriculum come to be organized as a dissociation, a restorative fantasy, a wish? Such a wish might be articulated as: if my students were to be truly moved or truly understand, they and their generation will build a world in which such events will never happen again. But if they aren’t strong enough, what lessons of despair might they draw? This ambivalence structuring the educator’s curriculum planning can give rise to what she terms an “ambivalent pedagogy” that seeks to shield learners from the very representations of suffering to which it seeks to expose them in the service of a larger agenda of social change.
This then is one of the qualities of social justice learning/teaching that renders learning/teaching difficult: studying grave injustice carries a heavy mandate with high stakes that organize curriculum around intensely libidinally charged wishes. Taking responsibility for the world in Arendt’s terms (1961) renders the already affectively charged labour of teaching and teacher-student relationship even more so as it bears the weight of that world (p. 196).

The difficulty or paradox arising from the ethical weight and psychic intensity of these high stakes is the dilemma Britzman (1998) first noted: it’s painful to tolerate the conditions of learning, namely resistance (p. 118). The ethical dimensions of this paradox are elaborated by Todd in her 2003 meditation: she reads Levinasian and psychoanalytically-informed scholarship in education together in order to inquire into the ethical implications of the kinds of psychical complications incited when SJE stages student encounters with social difference and injustice (within an anti-oppression agenda) (p. 3).

In mounting her argument, Todd (2003) defines the objectives of social justice education (SJE) in Levinasian terms which illuminate a particular paradox: she presumes that SJE seeks, not to inculcate certain ethical virtues or codes of conduct in students, but to engage them in an ongoing examination of the ethicality of their relations with others with the goal of discerning and cultivating less violent forms of interaction and relationality (p. 9). In Levinasian terms, she posits violence as a practice of epistemological certitude and instrumentalization. There can be no ethical relationship when I reduce an individual or group to an object of knowledge that conform to stable, predictable, instrumentalizable categories.

To follow Levinas, when I think I know, when I think I understand the Other, I am exercising my knowledge over the Other, shrouding the Other in my own totality. The
Other becomes an objet of my comprehension, my world, my narrative, reducing the Other to me. (Todd, 2003, p. 15)

She notes a parallel violence in pedagogies that approach ethics as a “problem of knowledge.” With this term, Todd (2003) challenges a foundational premise of Western ethical philosophy, that is, that moral development is a problem solvable through knowledge acquisition (pp. 6-7). The implication of this implication is that the “right” kind of knowledge can act as a guarantor of moral action. Within this instrumentalization of ethics, she argues, education becomes a practice of persuasion that presumes students lack “knowledge of what is right, good or simply better” in order to act morally (p. 7).

Pedagogy is also violent in this Levinasian sense, not only in its instrumentalization and certitude, but also in that it depends, as Castoriadis (in Todd, 2003, p. 19) argues, on the demand for the learning subject “to change, to alter, to become something other than what it was.” My commitment to broad social change through education depends upon my students changing into subjects who act more ethically in the world; in this sense, my students are the agents of my project and it is upon them that my success depends. Todd grounds her analysis of the violence of pedagogy’s address (or demand) in Drucilla Cornell’s definition of ethical relationality as “the aspiration to a nonviolent relationship to the Other, and to otherness more generally, that assumes responsibility to guard the Other against the appropriation that would deny her difference and singularity” (Cornell in Todd, 2003, p. 151).

The commitment of education, not to protect students in their difference and singularity but to expose them to a curricular address that demands self-alteration is, according to Todd, violent and unethical. It can only be ethically balanced by educators’ capacity to be responsive or receptive to “what is unpredictably returned to the teacher: the meanings
students make and the vulnerabilities that accompany them” (Todd, 2003, p. 32).

If educators demand that students make relationships to curriculum, and if these relationships are always uncertain and open to failure, then the place of ethicality in education lies in the failure of the demand for learning … the moments when students struggle for meaning, struggle to make sense out of and symbolize [or narrate] their relationship to curriculum, where teachers are called upon to be receptive, where a nonviolent element to the teaching-learning relationship may be allowed to enter. (Todd, 2003, p. 32)

Social justice curriculum can be understood, then, as organized by a wish, burdened by educators’ ongoing struggles to settle the meaning of incommensurable suffering into a teleology of hope in the form of instrumental models of social change through the moral guarantees of particular knowledge acquisition. If this wish is expressed in the pedagogical address as a demand, then according to Todd (2003), it is only in welcoming the unique response of the student as the grounds of their learning that we might defuse the unethical violence of the demand (p. 38).

This paradox points to the second quality of social justice education that renders teaching/learning SJE difficult: while justice-oriented pedagogies aim to support students in developing nonviolent relations with others, the ethical and psychic stakes weighing on teachers when the subjects studied include mass suffering and social trauma can have the effect of intensifying the violence of the pedagogical demand on students to self-alter or draw particular conclusions from traumatic knowledge. In turn, this can reduce teachers’ tolerance or receptivity to students’ complex responses (including resistance), struggles and ‘failures’. The urgency of our project—and our own need for
consolation—weighs on what should be our ethical and pedagogical obligation to listen. When pedagogy becomes a defence against loss or against thought as described by Britzman (2000), it becomes less responsive and more violent (p. 37).

Discursive and Sensate frames of Global Justice Education
The course under discussion was originally focused on examining the institutional construction of inequality of opportunity along historically established lines (gender, ethnoracial group, SES, sexuality). The rapidly growing global extremes of inequity, subalternization and precarity led me to reorient the course to focus on education’s lived relation to the politics of social difference, alterity and inequity globally as well as locally (i.e. global capitalism, imperialism and militarization).

A course on global justice and education has many strange bedfellows. Global education and global citizenship education are part of a context of institutionalized practices which, while agreeing upon a common principle of global interdependence or connectivity, rarely examine the terms upon which North-South connections or relations are imagined. Recent critical Canadian scholarship argues that the imaginaries of much global citizenship education rest upon universalist Eurocentric Enlightenment categories of the subject of global solidarity, citizenship, and development.

A critical vigilance towards the Eurocentric notions of common humanity and interdependence invoked in global citizenship education points to what has emerged as a central question of representation animating the course. As Butler (2009) phrases it, “the critique of violence [and injustice] must begin with the question of the representability of life itself: what allows a life to become visible in its precariousness and its need for shelter, and what is it that keeps us from seeing or understanding certain lives in this way?” (p. 51). By what
discursive and sensate processes, that is, are certain people insulated from awareness of the suffering of others, particularly forms of suffering upon which their quality of life depends?

This is Butler’s epistemological question. She argues in her latest book that “frames of war” carve out sharply delineated “domains of the knowable” (Butler, 2009, pp. 6-7). As such they act as structures of intelligibility that “condition and produce norms of recognizability” or even perceptibility of different lives (Butler, 2009, pp. 6-7). These norms are operative at the level of social affect, she argues, such that Western viewers experience a differential affective response to the suffering or loss of different lives globally⁶. As an example, the vastly differential outpouring of public mourning in response to the 2007 Virginia Tech killings versus a general sense of fatigue in the face of a seemingly monotonous loss of Iraqi and Afghan civilian lives (and even US soldiers’ lives) can be understood to reflect a form of societal “sensate regulation” of North Americans through their inscription within a clearly hegemonic circuit of social affect (Butler, 2009, pp. 50-52).

War sustains its practices through acting on the senses, crafting them to apprehend the world selectively, deadening affect in response to certain images and sounds, and enlivening affective responses to others. This is why war works to undermine a sensate democracy, restricting what we can feel, disposing us to feel shock and outrage in the face of one expression of violence and righteous coldness in the face of another. (Butler, 2009, pp. 51-52)

Drawing from social affect theory, Butler (2009) posits that the frames of war act as fields of recognizability to regulate affect and “broker the encounter between first-world viewers who seek to understand” through sensate perceptions and feelings such as empathy (p. 78). Precarity for Butler, then, is a politically induced condition of differential exposure (or
proximity) to others and circumstances beyond one’s control. She argues that there is, however, a paradox in this differentially experienced precarity: “responsiveness—and thus, ultimately, responsibility—is located in the affective responses to a sustaining and impinging world” (Butler, 2009, p. 34).

She is arguing, then, that the division of the world into unequal patterns of grievable and ungrievable lives is effected through a circuit of social affect. This circuit conditions the possibility for Western viewers’ responsiveness (or responsibility) towards those global Others, the representations of whose suffering is often proffered in global education in the hopes of galvanizing different emotions (pathos, empathy, solidarity) as a route to critical agency vis-à-vis the sources of this suffering.

One of the qualities of global justice education that makes teaching/learning difficult is the heightened urgency and stakes of studying the extremes of structural violence and precarity in which we are implicated as citizens of the North. Indeed, the triumphalism of post-1989 discourses of capitalist globalization and the unprecedented concentrations of global power can argue convincingly for the inevitability of this injustice. This can intensify teachers’ psychic struggles and trigger what Pitt and Britzman (2003) argue are elemental anxieties in teaching: “insufficiency of knowledge, primal helplessness, and the incapacity to respond adequately” (p. 758). While the complexity and apparent inevitability of militarized corporate economies unsurprisingly provoke a sense of individual insufficiency and incapacity, these anxieties also index early experiences of learning that return when one faces knowledge that requires something significant of the learner (Pitt and Britzman, 2003, p. 758). Todd’s work is valuable to my project of exploring this nexus of discursive and psychic dynamics of global justice learning.
Butler’s theory not only underlines the extremes of global precarity we are facing. It also points to a second difficult quality of global justice education in that it complicates GJE’s epistemology, that is, the objective that students gain knowledge about suffering in the South as a vehicle to changing their actions that are implicated in this injustice. In arguing that attempts to know the South are inevitably mediated through structured fields of apprehensibility that work at the level of sensate regulation and take the form of affect, Butler’s argument underlines the crisis of representation and directs our attention to the granular level of affect in learning as a fraught battlefield. Indeed, her focus on the affective/experiential and violent skin of sociality as the locus of imperial and counter-imperial projects draws our attention as educators to the challenge of learning “where the crisis of representation that is exterior to the self meets the crisis of representation that is interior to the learner” (Pitt & Britzman, 2003, p. 756).

A Butlerian analysis of the ways global inequity is normalized through frames of war that render precarious lives inapprehensible can lead to particular pedagogical solutions that seek to disrupt circuits of indifference. Such an antiwar pedagogy would seek to provoke affective responses, to render learners in the North susceptible to the precarity lived by citizens in the South. At the same time, her analysis of the operation of sensate regulation cautions that provoking affective engagement is hardly a guarantee. Her analysis seems to recommend a pedagogy of simultaneously provoking and directing attention to the norms and fields of recognizability that underpin our habits of differential recognition of the value of human life. One approach to such a pedagogy would involve encounters with representations of human experience of injustice curated to trigger breakdowns as well as a re-examination of these frames and the closed circuits of selective apprehension they teach.
This raises a third difficult quality of global justice education: current practices inherit competing models and discourses of teaching/learning that situate the latter squarely in the arena of affect with different but equally troubling ethical implications. Broadly speaking, liberal humanist models of GCE tend to elicit empathy in attempt to recruit emotions of altruism, generosity and solidarity as motivation for changed actions to alleviate global inequity and suffering (I will discuss this further below). Postcolonial, anticolonial and antiracist models ask students to examine their privilege and implication as a means of developing self-criticality and ethical obligation (and sometimes moral indignation). This critical model is particularly intolerant of affective responses of guilt (see my discussion of Todd below, Conclusion).

What is at stake in these competing models is a notion of common humanity to which pedagogy might have recourse in eliciting affective responses to the suffering of distant misrecognized global others. We might understand this by contrasting Butler’s (2009) and Todd’s (2009) theorizations of what relationships are shared amongst differently located subjects. It seems Butler (2003, 2009) is conceptualizing precarity/responsiveness as conditions of life produced through unwilled but inescapable relations of sociality. She posits a commonality to which GJE might recourse as a shared capacity to be injured. In contrast, Sharon Todd (2009) finds a continuity amongst different subjects in our shared capacity to injure. She defines humanity, not as some universal, pre-existent, intrinsic virtue, the opposite of violence, but rather emergent from a relation of intersubjectivity or proximity. From a Levinasian perspective, she insists, this is a relation of violence. Taking a dramatic example from global citizenship education, I open myself to apprehending the horrific suffering and injustice not only consequent of, but also necessary to, the sociopolitical and material resources I enjoy as a citizen of the global North. These resources have accrued over five centuries of slavery, colonization, genocide,
underdevelopment and transnational capitalism. There is a violence implicit in the call of this understanding, implicit both in my freedom to turn away in indifference and in the overwhelming sense of responsibility I might feel, for my good fortune, toward the Other (those with whom I share this planet). My path between these dual poles of violence traces a “trajectory, that time and space of ethical responsibility, which signifies a relationship of non-violence without banishing or denying the risk of eruption of violence itself” (Todd, 2009, p.6). If intersubjectivity is antagonistic (as Todd casts it in Levinasian terms), if sociality is always imbricated in violence, then humanity cannot be taught but only faced as the potential violence implicit in any relationship. “Humanity’s name is the responsibility that is forged out of the trauma and the ever-present threat of violence” that emerges from concrete situations in which we find ourselves (Todd, 2009, p. 8).

Rather than staging encounters in which students might face a common humanity understood in Butler’s sense of a common condition of injurability as appeals to empathy, anticolonial models challenge students to face a common humanity understood in Todd’s sense of a universal fallibility or capacity to injure or violate others as evidenced by contemporary testimonial representations of injustice. In other words, there are competing models of learning GJE as a practice of implication via affective engagement; if unexamined, the identification and transference elicited by empathy- or obligation-based approaches, or the punitive intolerance of antiracism approaches may find themselves host to powerful, unexpected libidinal responses. This course seeks to stage an exercise in observing and learning from these libidinal responses to GJE models of teaching/learning (Britzman & Pitt, 1996).

These competing models of teaching/learning global justice education that work differently in the arena of affect raise difficulties for building ethical, nonviolent relations amongst teachers, learners and the subjects of study. Todd’s concerns with the violence of social justice
education’s pedagogical address (its demand of the student to self-alter) suggest that pedagogies that seek to curate a crisis in learning might be ethical only if they are able to “say yes to who or what turns up” (Gilbert, 2006). What students do with the curricular encounters that educators so meticulously curate is, as Simon (2011) has argued, indeterminable. Students encounter representations of the traumatic experience of global Others in particular ways. Not only is their apprehension mediated by frames of war and neo-imperialism, but other familiar frames are operative when these representations are staged as curricular objects within the ameliorative narratives of progressive pedagogy. As Simon (forthcomingB) cautions, “[Students] will have a sense of what to expect and possibly a sense of what they are expected to feel”; such encounters are shaped, he argues, by “the interplay between what we do know (or think we know) and what we don’t know or don’t want to know, and what we desire of and for ourselves and accept as our responsibilities.”

Saying ‘yes’ to what students do with curricular objects also implies being open to reading student responses as more than they appear, as articulations or narrations of both new and older, unfinished psychic battles that structure their encounters with difficult knowledge (Britzman, 2000). Indeed, my students’ doings tell much of the fractures and regimes of truth underpinning my teaching itself and the classroom dynamics that structure some of the learning conditions students navigate.

Below, I bring an attention to these difficult qualities of SJE and GJE to an examination of the curricular objectives and pedagogical conditions of a course that asks beginning teachers to make meaning of their encounters with the traumatic knowledge of global injustice—in particular, to attempt to make pedagogical meaning—and to narrate their struggles in planning for and responding to their peers’ similar curricular encounters. Britzman’s theory of learning from the reception
of difficult and traumatic knowledge informs both the design of the course pedagogy described below and my analysis of student response. In particular, this demands a pedagogy that explicitly attends to the dynamics of response in student learning, one that creates spaces for learners and pedagogues to examine, articulate and discuss these dynamics and offers a language to frame this movement from affect to thought and judgment (Simon, 2011). I describe below the course activity within which the student writing samples under examination were produced and the questions I bring to this inquiry.

Context, Course Curriculum and Questions
The course is a mandatory component within the preservice programme of a small English-language liberal arts university in Quebec, Canada. The majority of the almost 250 students in this four-year B. Ed. programme are white Canadian-born Anglophones aged 19-24 from ethnically homogeneous rural communities. The sample in this study is thus largely consistent with the predominance of Euro-Canadian middle class candidates in teacher education programmes across the country (Levine-Rasky, 2000). Confirming much antiracism research (Banks, 2006; Levine-Rasky, 2002, 1998; Sleeter, 2001; Solomon, 2000), my documentation of this course suggests that Canadian-born, White-identified preservice students tend to bring a poverty of cross-cultural experiences or analysis of structural discrimination and privilege as well as meritocratic ideologies of North American society and the global political economy.

This qualitative study examines samples of student work from one section of a mandatory undergraduate course on social justice and global education. Students are introduced in the course to sociological frameworks for the analysis of intersecting forms of inequality and to a cultural studies analysis of the discursive construction of social
difference through processes of representation and identification, normalization and abjection. There is also substantial discussion of the dynamics of resistance in learning and the concept of difficult knowledge, introduced in class as knowledge that makes demands upon the knower; knowledge which is kept outside the bounds of the ‘thinkable’ and which, when introduced into the conscious attention of a learner, contradicts valued self-images (particularly the image of oneself as a coherent, good person) to the point of threatening the break-up of self-integrity.

The course asks students not only to develop an analysis of social injustice but to experiment with pedagogies addressing injustice with an agenda of social change. In one assignment, groups of six to nine students are expected to preview and research issues of inequality, power and resistance raised by one of five dramatic or documentary films viewed in the course, and then design questions for and facilitate small-group, post-screening discussions (as single or pairs of facilitators). The film in this case, “Life and Debt” by Stephanie Black (2001), documents the history of postcolonial Jamaica’s struggles for economic autonomy since independence, as it is faced with the predatory financial, trade, commercial and labour practices of international lending institutions, trade agreements and multinational corporations. The documentary explicitly addresses audiences in the North in the moral condemnation of its narrative voice: “If you come to Jamaica as a tourist, this is what you will see.” It pairs footage of pleasure-seeking, oblivious tourists at an “all inclusive” resort with an examination of the social and economic devastation sustaining but hidden from tourists’ experience. Students are expected to supplement the film and accompanying readings with their own research into other examples of the impact of late capitalist, militarized globalization. Some also research the environmental and social impact of tourism; labour practices of Canadian companies; neoliberal restructuring policy; forced migration
driven by growing global economic gaps; and domestic ideological reactions to economically and politically-driven immigration.

Guidelines explicitly encourage facilitator groups to use this exercise as an opportunity to experiment with planning and facilitating encounters with the kinds of difficult knowledge the film offers. Facilitator groups must meet separately to consider questions of difficult knowledge, resistance and pedagogy in preparation for facilitation (for assignment instructions, see Taylor, 2011, appendix). After the activity, each facilitator writes a 1-2 page reflection on their intentions, experiences, observations and challenges facilitating the small-group discussion, focusing on questions of difficult learning and insights for future teaching. They bring this for discussion to a final group meeting that must produce a one-page collective reflection on these issues.

The design of this assignment draws from Pitt and Britzman’s (2003) conception of difficult knowledge that encompasses “both the representations of social traumas in the curriculum and the individual’s encounters with them in pedagogy” (p. 755), encounters which are presumed to activate charged “faultlines” in learners’ libidinal histories of learning (Britzman, 2009, p. 120) in ways that resist coherent narration or symbolization. The assignment is designed, then, to stage students’ encounters with representations of grave injustice—and attempts to address it in their own teaching—as an object of consideration and opportunity for insight into certain difficult qualities of GJE, in particular the fraught dynamics of response (student and teacher). While this is highly ambitious and demanding, it anticipates the ways many politically engaged teachers make curriculum, becoming aware of and researching developments in issues of importance to them and translating these often quite directly (in the form of newspaper articles or invited speakers) into curriculum. It is my hope that the exercise can take advantage of the forum of the course to examine difficult qualities of such activist teaching easily missed in the day-to-day of schools. In
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particular, I hope to provoke our awareness of the unconscious dimension of teaching (Britzman, 2000, pp. 36-8) that is structured and haunted by a teacher’s ongoing struggles with the affective demands of difficult knowledge.

In the section under study, the facilitator group decided to plan a role-play as an exercise to prepare the class for discussion of the documentary. To be clear, this paper does not advocate the pedagogy of the roleplay nor argues for it as the grounds of developing relations of ethicality/nonviolence. While I elaborate below my concerns regarding roleplay as a pedagogical exercise, I maintained my pedagogical commitment to students using this assignment as an exercise in responding pedagogically to social justice issues of import to them and as an opportunity to observe and work through the psychic and ethical implications of their response. The students’ decision to use roleplay may have drawn inspiration from some of the global education resources made available in the course10. These demonstrate a tradition of experiential activities aimed at concretizing, embodying and personalizing structural relations (see, for example, ReThinking Schools 1998, 2003) as invitations for students to attach to complex, emotionally charged issues (issue such as global social injustice, our implication in it and possibilities for responsibility and intervention). The facilitator group divided the class into a range of stake-holder groups representing areas such as global capitalist production, exploitation, under-development and tourism: Canadian college students on Winter Break (facilitated by Sandra11); Jamaican farmers; Jamaican hotel and garment factory managers (facilitated by Heather); hotel and factory workers in a tax-free zone; and incarcerated Jamaican activists or undocumented migrants in detention centres (with Siva). These roles reflected the groups’ research into growing political as well as economic injustice associated with late capitalist globalization. These included mounting cases of illegal detention and torture associated not only with practices of
labour exploitation, collusion with and support of authoritarian corrupt states, the burgeoning global arms economy and the suppression of human and environmental rights movements by multinational corporations, but also with increasing securitization and militarization of borders since 9/11. For example, representing domestic and border police forces, Ann randomly arrested and handed “troublemakers” amongst the farmer and worker groups over to Siva, who kept the captives kneeling and blindfolded in a separate, soundproof space while she quietly read aloud accounts of detention and torture from Amnesty International reports.

Ellsworth has argued that the space of difference between pedagogy’s mode of address—who it imagines students to be, what it imagines them to know or not know or need to know or be interested to learn—and students’ reception or response to pedagogy or curriculum is a historically and psychically informed social space “characterized by oscillation, slippages and unpredictable transformations” (Donald, 1992, p.2 in Ellsworth, 1997, p. 42). She has also argued, reading Felman (1987), that it is a space of difference that offers possible insight into the psychic dynamics of teaching and learning, in that it bears the trace of the “third participant” in the teacher-student relationship: the unconscious. (Ellsworth, 1997, p. 63). My interest in these excerpts, then, lies in their narration of such spaces of difference. I am also curious about the stories facilitators tell of the space of translation between their responses to the documentary and the structure of address in their pedagogy. Their narratives describe spaces of their emotional labour to make sense but also to make use of the difficult knowledge provoked by their viewings, and to make sense of their peers’ creative use of the curricular objects they have constructed.

Because it is specifically this space of difference—this psychosocial interface—that Butler and Todd have identified as the locus of imperial and counter-imperial projects and the violent setting of cosmopolitan
learning, I bring a series of questions related to what the students’ narration of making sense—including pedagogical sense—of their own and their peers’ encounters with representations of social traumas might tell us about:

- What is difficult in studying/teaching the devastation of the contemporary militarized, imperial global capitalist order in which we are profoundly implicated as citizens in the global North? (particularly the dynamics of proximity/responsiveness and the affective histories they return)

This question comprises several sub-questions:

- What is difficult about making meaning from encounters with representations of grave injustice and suffering that bring learners into susceptibility or proximity (Butler) to lives invisible within frames of war? How does this encounter live the effects of and reactions to different forms of loss that return a traumatic history of learning?
- What is difficult about making curriculum from the significance constructed from such encounters? How is curriculum organized by teachers’ longer conflicts and defences against implicated learning as these are interpreted through inherited discourses of social and global justice education?
- What is difficult about remaining pedagogically attentive to unpredictable and uncertain student responses to a curriculum that stages encounters with representations of suffering within a larger implicit demand that students alter themselves
(Todd, 2003) and their actions in this world in ways to alleviate suffering?

- Secondly, what can student narrations of teaching social justice tell me about what is difficult in global justice teacher education, specifically the wishes and anxieties, the certainties and discursive foreclosures underpinning my own conduct of it in this course, the theories of transformative learning circulating in my GJE curriculum?12

Methodologically, I draw inspiration from the qualities of psychoanalytically informed research posited by Pitt and Britzman (2003, pp. 758-759). Conceptualizing student narratives of their learning experience—encountering, planning curriculum and responding pedagogically to peers’ encounters with representations of global injustice in which one is undeniably implicated—as a psychic event demands that I approach the “data” of student writing samples in complex ways. Both student narratives (data) and my interpretations thereof (theory) are constructions that don’t claim a direct correspondence to the kinds of observations that have a particular weight of proof in empirical research (Pitt and Britzman, 2003, p. 759). That is, both of these narratives attempt to “work at two levels, the manifest and the latent” within the psychic time of learning. My interpretations of the manifest and latent dimensions of student writing samples pay attention to persistent “ripples of affect” (Pitt & Britzman, 2003 p. 758) with an interest in speculations that open interpretations that resonate with and pry open the faultlines and paradoxes of GJE as outlined above (that is, my primary question: can engaged teaching be nonviolent?).

Presented below are excerpts of an analysis of the package comprised of seven, one to three page individual facilitator reflections and the group summary. The excerpts below from four facilitators were selected
to allow a focused discussion of a particular series of concerns I bring to this project. The excerpts narrate the crises and vicissitudes of the students’ encounters with knowledge of the devastating human consequences of neo-imperial globalization, their translation of this experience into curriculum, and their struggles to respond to their peers’ responses.

Attending to Student Narrations of Difficult Learning and Teaching

Difficult knowledge can be understood to refer to “the ‘traces’ or ripples psychical dynamics leave in narratives about knowledge” (Pitt & Britzman, 2003, p. 757). Such ripples are discernable in the student facilitators’ discussions not only of their own struggles to make sense of their encounters with representations of devastating injustice and human suffering presented in the documentary and their own research, but also of their struggles to make pedagogical sense of these encounters and of their peers’ response to such encounters in the roleplay.

As I researched the topic of torture and deportation, I entered a big space of difficult knowledge myself. There was a shift from knowing that ‘things like this happen to people’, to ‘how am I responsible for what is happening, and what is my role in creating change?’ This difficult knowledge pressed heavy against me and I felt a responsibility to show it to other people (Siva, emphasis original).

Questions of responsibility, guilt and shame weave through the facilitating group’s written reflections. In this excerpt, Siva asks what it means to be responsible, both in terms of her past and current participation in the emergence of the conditions of grave injustice, and in terms of her actions in response to such knowledge, that might work to
sustain, ameliorate or redress this injustice.

Much of the course curriculum addresses the first dimension of responsibility. Anchored in postcolonial, antiracist, feminist Marxist analysis of systemic discrimination, the course aims to develop students’ critical analysis of the ways institutional, spatial, discursive and sensate forms of power implicate individuals within complex relations of inequity. These are, nevertheless, extremely challenging processes to “see” and in which to intervene. Documenting competing public discourses in Australia responding to the history of Aboriginal residential schools, Danielle Celermajer (2006) notes the hegemony of classical liberal jurisprudential discourses of guilt and responsibility (pp. 158-60). These discourses, she notes, are “structurally hostile to encoding collective responsibility”. Turning on notions of intentionality, blame and liability, these discourses reduce guilt to an individual act intent on harm. They invite the defence, “I wasn’t there. I didn’t do it.” Similarly, living in the global North, I am not the one firing or abusing the workers making the products I buy; I did not personally bomb Iraq or Afghanistan; I did not demand structural adjustment from indebted nations or refuse a child an education or health care. I did not ask for all this privilege.

Celermajer (2006) turns to the German theorist Karl Jaspers for a more nuanced notion of “political guilt” (p. 164): “every person is co-responsible for the way he [sic] is governed” (Jaspers in Celermajer, 2006, p. 165). Positing the Hegelian-influenced notion of Dasein, Jaspers argues that individuals are constituted as subjects of a moral/cultural/political world, the political community of which they constitute an important dimension. He argues that one is embedded or constituted as a subject of this community in implicating ways (Celermajer, 2006, p. 166). As such, responsibility or political guilt encompasses one’s participation in collectively sustaining public cultures of violation, the “commission of countless little acts of negligence, of convenient adaptation of cheap
vindication, and the imperceptible promotion of wrong; the participation in the creation of a public atmosphere that spreads confusion and thus makes evil possible” (Cermajer, 2006, p. 167). Responsibility lies not in an individual action but from tolerating and participating in a political culture that licences and justifies these actions (Cermajer, 2006, pp. 170-171). This expands classical liberal jurisprudential conceptions of individual responsibility and criminal guilt to encompass collective processes across generations, time and space, “so long as the [cultural] pattern continues to organize significant aspects of the institutional structure” (Cermajer, 2006, p. 171).

In linking individuals to political culture, to responsibility for the creation and maintenance of the conditions for institutional and political actions, Jaspers’ notion of embeddedness offers conceptions of responsibility that include the cultivation of political cultures within the institution of education and schools. This encompasses, then, the second dimension of responsibility that Siva raises above. Teachers committed to social justice seek through their curriculum to foster, in schools, political cultures that support and condition nonviolent political actions and relationships of power/resources. They attempt to foster in their classroom cultures the kind of indirect participation and collective responsibility identified by Jaspers. But what notions of responsibility do teachers construct from the visceral experience of difficult knowledge’s burden and what pedagogical responses do they craft from this meaning? How are these pedagogical responses structured and what traces do they bear of both psychic struggle and discursive frames for working through these struggles?

Struggles With Loss
Siva writes of the weight of her encounter with the knowledge of suffering generated by our militarized economic order and neo-imperial
political cultures, knowledge that pressed heavy on her in its demands for response: “I felt sadness and disgust that as human beings we are capable of such cruelty towards others.” Her description resonates with the challenges of cosmopolitan education noted by Todd (2009), that is, the challenge of facing our universal capacity for cruelty and violence. What links disparate individuals, Todd (2009) argues, is not a universal virtue but a common potential for violence. “Humanity’s name is the responsibility that is forged out of the trauma and the ever-present threat of violence” that emerges from concrete situations in which we find ourselves (p. 8).

Facing a shared capacity for violence effects different kinds of loss. One loses one’s faith in a concept of humanity as a shared, defining if aspirational virtue (Todd, 2009). Siva’s sadness and disgust seem to respond to the fact of a shared capacity for cruelty in which she implicates herself, a recognition that demands a painful identification and reimagining of the task of educators. She wards off a sense of helplessness, however, in trust that the educational challenge lies in accessing a particular form of knowledge: “And yet I felt a strong need to make the point, and to live the experience. My concern is that the group members were thinking that the experience was bad, but that ‘it would never happen to me’” (Siva).

The pedagogical sense Siva and her group make out of this experience of loss is a persuasive pedagogy (“to make the point”). The education wager is that my actions will change after living an experience of suffering that is supposed to happen only to other people. The knowledge I gain convinces me of the unacceptability of this suffering but also of all that I have in common with distant others, including our susceptibility to such suffering. It is noteworthy that Siva is invoking Butler’s sense of responsibility in this excerpt, responsibility emergent not from facing our common capacity to injure others but our common injurability (i.e. this suffering indeed could happen to me). As discussed
above, Butler’s sense of humanity, grounded in a common injurability, risks launching a new sovereign subject that loses sight of specificity in the appeal to universality: I explore this below in relation to the dynamics of identification and empathy.

Implicit in the design and tone of the role-play is a particular theory of learning to act (more) ethically or less violently through or as a consequence of simulated experience. A foundational premise of much Western moral philosophy according to Todd (2003, p. 7), this theory posits knowledge as the “guarantor of moral action” (p. 8) and instrumentalizes ethics as a “problem of knowledge” acquisition (p. 6) such that education becomes a practice of persuasion to ensure students accept the right knowledge that might guarantee moral action (p. 7). The implicit assumption is that if only privileged, indifferent citizens of the North knew the exploitation and suffering experienced by citizens of the South to support our living standard—and if we could know this not only as objective facts but in a personal, embodied way that engages our emotions—the possession of such knowledge would ensure certain conclusions in the form of moral action.

Roleplays are extremely common in social and global justice education and raise several epistemological and ethical concerns. The theory of learning underpinning them—that the required knowledge of the suffering of others can be acquired through simulated suffering—clearly ignores that this simulation of suffering is not only a construction that selectively reconstructs certain conditions of that suffering and not others, and that it reproduces conditions only, thereby reductively misrepresenting the lived understandings, the creative resistance and meaning made by its targets (for example, blindfolds can never simulate an experience of blind culture). Furthermore, it forgets the ways the design of the simulated experience can bear the psychic struggles and projections of the curriculum designer, the teacher.

This experiential theory of ethical learning is not uncommon in social
justice education but it is also not without risk. For example, I have long been troubled by the punitive potential of Jane Elliot’s “Blue eyes/brown eyes” exercise, an activity developed in moral outrage at the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King in a particular context of polarized and violent race relations. This exercise is reproduced in very different contexts, often without a nuanced examination of the dynamics it can set in motion (see e.g. Elliott; George Syme C.S. Staff, 2010). Pedagogies anchored in a theory of moral development as emergent from experiential knowledge of simulated suffering enter fraught territory especially when they are underpinned by a belief that indifference, complacency or privilege require some form of piercing or shock to make space for excluded forms of apprehension.

In her review of the exhibition, Beautiful Suffering: Photography and the Traffic in Pain, Mieke Bal worries about political art that attempts to mobilize highly charged affective responses to representations of complex, structural injustice. Drawing from Bennett’s (2005) extensive critique of the potential for sentimentalism in the reception of such representations, she cautions that the appeal to affect can itself initiate a dangerous form of “sentimental education” (Bal, 2006, p. 108). Of particular concern are representations relying upon character-based naturalization for their encouragement of non-reflective identification: “identification is a mostly unreflective process, a response to something emotionally charged ... It is not something one does but rather something that happens to one on the basis of earlier psychic formations and tendencies or by socializing training under the pressure of ideological formations” (Bal, 2006, p. 110). For Bal, the principle danger of unreflective identification with the suffering of others is the challenge of bringing this powerful affect into the arena of ethical deliberation. In this sense, it has been extensively argued that identification can defend against the demands of witnessing (Britzman, 1998; Boler, 1999; Simon, 2000; Simon, Rosenberg & Eppert, 2005). This is because “identification is
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precisely this susceptibility to the other but a susceptibility that is incomplete and subject to its own reversals into its opposite: disregard for the other” (Britzman, 2000, p. 35).

The question at stake in these discussions of the forms of non-reflective identification elicited within empathy-based moral pedagogies is their amenability to moral deliberation and the development of ethical or nonviolent relations and actions. According to Todd (2003), the theory that simulated suffering can form the tactical grounds to develop either students’ understanding of or feeling for the life of others excluded from regimes of recognizability stems from a long tradition of social justice education and moral philosophy (p. 43). In her exploration of empathy as a potential conduit of ethical action, she argues (2003) that a chief concern is that pedagogies eliciting empathetic projection as a path to understanding and motivation to intervene in the suffering of others risk reductive simplification and symbolic violence (in the Levinasian terms) (p. 46-50). This is because empathy is motivated by the desire to either appropriate and assimilate the Other’s uniqueness or, in its failure, to reinstate difference through pity, judgment, and vicarious emotional tourism.13 She stresses that it reflects an initial receptivity; as a mode of relationality across difference, however, the impulse to find oneself in the other is ultimately violent and precludes ethical listening (Todd, 2003, pp. 60-61). In its curiosity—“What would I feel in their condition? What would I do?”—it ultimately reveals only dimensions and fantasies of oneself. While reluctant to prohibit empathy in learning contexts, Todd (2003) does warn that it can only serve as a limited basis of self-reflection and perhaps insight, but should never be mistaken for a basis of moral action (pp. 62-63).

While the theories of learning underpinning the roleplay’s design can be traced to pedagogical models inherited from SJE and education’s more general faith in the ideal of learning from experience (Britzman, 2007, p. 11), student writing below suggests that the design of this role
play was also organized by the facilitating group’s ongoing struggle to make meaning from the experience of loss triggered by the difficult knowledge of global injustice and specific representations of suffering. In their narration of their pedagogical goals, facilitators signal several emotions they considered potentially significant to their own and their peers’ learning to respond to the weight of difficult knowledge (including responsibility, empathy, guilt, shame and hope).

*Conceptions and Uses of Empathy and Guilt*

Planning the game, we fed off each other’s energy ... We even had fun creating the ‘game’ ... we added humour, albeit dark ... most important ... was to make our peers, the ‘players’, uncomfortable and put in a place they might not have ever thought of before -- to maybe force them to be ‘other’, to enforce a hierarchy on them that they had no say in, to reflect the emotions I felt underlying the guilt when I watched the film (Heather). Heather’s term *reflect* suggests several possible meanings or intentions, all of which draw upon some notion of empathy. The intention to “force them to be ‘other’, to enforce a hierarchy on them that they had no say in,” seems to describe a simulated experience of the subalternity, precarity and victimhood the group wished to highlight in the experiences of citizens of the global South. The simulation (or “reflection”) aims to open their peers to what was previously precluded from thought, that is, subject positions and understandings “they might not have ever thought of before” or been open to apprehending within the frames of war. The intent may have been to thereby alter their peers’ relationship to Jamaicans, to shift the inequitable distribution of recognizability and responsiveness conditioned by hegemonic circuits of indifference.
The word “uncomfortable” suggests a reference to the discomfort or anxieties of difficult knowledge as identified in course discussions. There is a complex structure in Heather’s description of the affective experience that the group designed as a vehicle to new knowledge or moral action in their roleplay pedagogy. Heather’s desire for the experience of the roleplay “to reflect the emotions I felt underlying the guilt when I watched the film” suggests a range of what they perceived to be a politically effective emotions. Heather’s language—“to enforce a hierarchy on them that they had no say in”—suggests provoking a loss of agency; this might emerge from the frustration of the overwhelming, complex and seemingly inevitable forces of bellicose capitalist economies. It might also index the helplessness and loss of mastery over meaning that Simon (2011, Note 1) associates with the “task of inheriting the troubling consequences of ‘the otherness of knowledge’”. Is it the “otherness of knowledge” that the facilitating group wanted to “reflect”? Was this knowledge experienced, not as an acquisition, accumulation or self-enhancement, but as the loss of mastery, of self-coherence, or of broader social forms of community (Britzman, 2000, pp. 28, 33)?

Todd (2003) asks why guilt is such a common response to curricular representations of injustice and suffering and in what ways it might condition ethical responsibility (p. 92). She argues that opening ourselves as educators to the potential role of students’ expressions of guilt in response to stories of suffering might challenge us to examine more closely our intentions in exposing them to these stories in the first place. Todd (2003) notes that social justice educators implicitly act on a belief that students have the capacity to be affectively moved as they become aware of the suffering of others and develop concern for others’ wellbeing in ways that are not purely egocentric but potentially ethical (p. 113). She argues via Melanie Klein and Emmanuel Levinas that expressions of guilt by students might most productively be approached as articulations of suffering in response to recognizing one’s guilt or
imagining one’s capacity to injure. She suggests that expressions of guilt in the face of one’s inadequate, belated capacities to respond or repair such suffering can be understood within a Levinasian ethics as a painful response to what appears an incommensurable demand. In this sense, she reminds us, we might adopt Levinas’ conception of guilt as a responsible response of a listener who recognizes his/her guilt and suffers from this knowledge (Todd, 2003, pp. 110-113).

Approaching guilt as a symptom with potential ethical significance demands that we attend to the specific volatility of such emotional work. Drawing on Klein, Todd situates guilt in the fantasy-driven oscillation between love, aggression and remorse experienced by an emergent social and ethical subject. Klein’s theory is valuable to social justice educators, she argues for the insight it lends into “the ambivalent emotions/affective vicissitudes that lie behind our attitudes to another’s suffering” (Todd, 2003, p. 104) and in particular the dramatic force of students’ expressions of rage, embarrassment, self-recrimination, indignation, innocence and contrition when they are asked to imagine their role in the conditions of another’s suffering.

Todd suggests that we might approach expressions of guilt as a “symptom of a susceptibility to social responsibility” and articulation of the emotional labour of seeking to implicate oneself and build a responsible (or reparative in Klein’s sense) relation to another’s suffering (2003, pp. 98, 113). I interpret this as an ethical and pedagogical call to take seriously the facilitators’ working through guilt, to consider the roleplay as a possible guilty response by the facilitators that sought to articulate an implicated mode of relationality to distant others. Her reconceptualization of guilt as an affective response of potential ethical significance also suggests the slippages and tensions amongst different models of response the facilitators were experiencing and exploring.

Todd also links guilt to the dramatic vicissitudes of student responses to representations of suffering. That is, Todd’s reconceptualization of
guilt highlights the work of fantasy in their struggles to build a relation to social violence, work that involves imagining one’s own capacity for violence and aggression. The enactment of simulated violence might provoke a “nascent awareness of another’s suffering and the part one plays in it” (Todd, 2003, p. 104). At the same time, the aggression elicited within the fraught arena of fantasy and ambivalence is subject to myriad older forces, as signaled by Klein and Bal, as questions of implication and responsibility are explored through different imagined relationships and modes of self-recognition in the roleplay.

_Vicissitudes of Aggression_

We wanted to make a difference, do something that would have an _impact_, that maybe would stay with our worn out peers during this high stress end of term time. Something that would stand out, something that had _bite_ … I wasn’t ready for the _bite_ (Heather, emphasis original).

Of note in Heather’s language is not only a certain violence (“impact”, “bite”), but also the authoritarian mode of address of the role play: “most important … was to make our peers, the ‘players’ … to maybe force them to be ‘other’, to enforce a hierarchy on them that they had no say in.” What does it mean when the response to an experience of radical exposure, proximity and loss in facing difficult knowledge is authoritarian? What consolation does it offer? How is helplessness displaced? How, as Britzman (1998) suggests, is the conflict of loss displaced, “rearranged, repeated, or worked through in pedagogy and curriculum” (pp. 125-127)? When conflict is displaced elsewhere does it return as aggression (or self-aggression)?

As I’ve argued above, one of the difficult qualities of teaching in response to devastating social and global injustice lies in the psychic dimensions of one’s response to the high stakes burdening this project.
The forms of loss initiated by the challenge of working through one’s role as an educator in the creation and potential transformation of the conditions of mass suffering—loss to a coherent sense of self, meaning and agency—can find consolation (in the form of hope) in the certainties offered by pedagogical discourses that displace transformational agency (“to make a difference”) onto students. This can render activist pedagogies not only a wish but also an aggressive demand to self-alter—particularly in persuasive pedagogies envisioning learning as a piercing or rupture (with “bite” or “impact”) of the circuits of selective indifference posited by Butler.

I found myself repeatedly announcing to my prisoners that this was just a game and it was okay to laugh ... In retrospect I was saying that to comfort myself because the things I was saying, the insults I was spitting out and the harsh treatment my ‘inmates’ were enduring were just not acceptable. Within myself I knew that this was a reality somewhere seemingly far away from my existence and that [our game] was a serious replica of an unacceptable situation (Ann).

Ann observes her own ambivalent pedagogy (Britzman, 1998, p. 119) of performing and defusing dramatized abuse and recognizes in herself a search for comfort or consolation under the weight of integrating knowledge of the “unacceptable situation” of neoimperial global exploitation. The education models and theories of learning through which this ambivalence came to be articulated and given pedagogical form need to also be situated within the discursive resources made available by my own conduct of this course.

Distinguishing between, on the one hand, the emotional labour suggested by facilitator narrations of conducting curriculum designed in response to the difficult knowledge triggered by the film and, on the other, the pedagogical models recruited to or underpinning their
teaching points to my second research question: what can student narrations of teaching social justice tell me about what is difficult in global justice teacher education, specifically the wishes and anxieties, the certainties and discursive foreclosures underpinning my own conduct of it in this course, the theories of transformative learning circulating in my GJE curriculum? It demands that I implicate myself in this examination and inquire into what my own pedagogy wants and how my students responded to that want.

As noted above, the course design reflects my own concerns regarding Eurocentric, liberal humanist models of GCE and my commitments to anticolonial and integrative antiracist educational projects. In response to these, it has come to focus, on the one hand, on radical critiques of globalization from the South in its content and, on the other hand, on fostering student analyses of systemic discrimination/privilege and self-implication in its pedagogical agenda. Postcolonial, anticolonial and antiracist models ask students to engage, not in exercises in empathy or generosity, but critical “self-subversive self-reflection” (Felman, 1987, p. 90; see also Davis, 1996; Taylor, 2007) and self-implication within global systems of power. That is, I design course pedagogy with the aim that students seek insights into their implication within the apparently distant, abhorrent violence of abstract phenomena like foreign wars or the global economy in ways that are “other” and subversive to the more consolatory, hegemonic discursive frames of self-recognition circulating within North American popular culture. While my conduct of such a pedagogy aims to create the conditions of ethical obligation (and sometimes moral indignation), the feminist antiracist attention to the politically and epistemically fraught effects of privilege (Narayan, 1988) and the starkly contrasting dichotomies mobilized in course materials (North/South; tourist/worker; privileged/exploited; over-consumption/precarity etc.)
offer morally abhorrent and perhaps painful modes of self-recognition for all of us as learners in the North\textsuperscript{14}.

The inclement otherness of these modes of self-knowledge on offer (as monolithic, ascriptive identity categories) could well be exacerbated by the challenges of designing a simulation aimed to reduce a complex neo-imperial militarized capitalist order to personified symbolic dramatic roles. Indeed, without the benefit of a rigorous analysis of the complexity of our contemporary global economic, legal and political order and its history, it would be extremely difficult to perform symbolic roles (global security forces, internationally condoned and financially supported dictatorial client states, corporate practices of labour management and production cost externalization etc.) and not reduce them to ahistorical, inherently capricious and malicious characters. North American popular culture and commercial news reporting tend towards the reductive individualization and dramatization of historical traumas into abstract ideas of “evil” (think of the political uses of the term ‘Nazi’; see also Hansen, 1996; Loshitzky, 1997). These social imaginaries are powerful resources readily at hand in the face of the challenges of making sense of incommensurable social breakdowns and traumas. They make particular sense, especially when examples selected to dramatize the violence of globalization include such horrific crimes as torture. It is possible, for example, that Siva’s focus on cases documented by Amnesty International had an impact on her analysis of the nature of global injustice in ways that shifted notions of responsibility, “political guilt” (Jaspers) and implication to liberal juridical discourses of individual liability, criminality and intentional cruelty.

The roleplay described by the facilitators appears to construct narratives of globalization framed by the Manichaean absolutism of “villains” and victims. Reflecting on her facilitation of the activity, Heather describes:

I played the role of the villain, the one who insulted,
decided and re-decided, took away choices and privileges
... I chose when they were to talk, if they were worthy, how long they could talk for and I changed my mind often. This mask I wore, the role I was to play that disturbed me profoundly for hours after, ironically saved me in class. I was able to hang on ... because all was happening so fast. When all was said and done I had a hard time taking off the mask (Heather).

The “mask” to which Heather refers is reminiscent of those used in theatre traditions (e.g. Greek tragedy and medieval morality plays) in which individual characters embody Manichaean forces of good and evil and are fatefuly subject to this ahistorical nature. Within this moral universe, evil is authoritarian, arbitrary and punitive.

Clearly, Manichaean explanations of global capitalism abound, including the binary representation of multinational corporations and Jamaican workers in Life and Debt. In the galvanizing moral outrage of Jamaica Kincaid’s narrative voice, the documentary addresses privileged tourists of the North oblivious to the cultural and economic colonialism in which their irresponsibility participates. As a powerful polemic and testimony of moral outrage, the film mobilizes a particular affective force for its audience of the North.

Of note, then, are the ways the mode of address of the course curriculum (my teaching, various curricular objects including the documentary) made available particular narratives and cultural frames that offer to settle facilitators’ inner turmoil in authoritative and consolatory meanings.

Shame and Self-Aggression
While the roleplay implicitly questioned the gross disparities of recognizability between the different local and global relations in which
we participate every day (i.e. if such indifference and exploitation are “inacceptable” with peers, why are they acceptable with others farther away?), the embodied performance of seemingly arbitrary maliciousness (“the one who insulted ... and I changed my mind often”) unleashed anxieties for facilitators that demanded their own consolation and repair. Sorting through and returning to original intentions was a lengthy task:

It took an hour for the adrenaline to wear off before things started to sink in and the mask I wore started to make my stomach upset. I relived many things. It wasn’t funny anymore, it wasn’t quick or witty, yet profound at the same time anymore. It was plain disturbing. I personally felt the mask as if it weren’t a mask but something I had done. I felt ashamed that I had been a facilitator and not someone in deportation (Heather).

If, following Todd, we approach student expressions and narrations as symptoms of the emotional labour of discerning and making sense of one’s relationship to others, we might ask what the slippage between facilitator avowals of responsibility, guilt and shame suggest about the conditions for self-recognition within the curriculum of both the course and the roleplay.

While recognizing both guilt and shame as responses reflecting an awareness of and susceptibility to the suffering of others (and thus responses with the potential to build ethical relationships and deliberation), Todd (2003) argues that shame expresses a narcissistic concern for how one is perceived and not necessarily an avowal of a moral relationship of social responsibility towards others (p. 94). This concern for appearances could certainly arise in the leaky relationships mounted in the roleplay amongst facilitators, the facilitated and social peers.

It is worth noting, however, that Heather connects her sense of shame specifically to her role or “mask as if it weren’t a mask but something I
had done.” The subject position offered to her as a mode of self-recognition is both a rigid category and a criminal (shameful) act. It is useful here to recall Danielle Celermajer’s (2006) argument for the reparative possibilities of shame within Australia’s “Sorry” movement. She argues that it is possible for progressive pedagogies to mobilize a textured sense of relationality to our ascribed social identities (categories that in part structure and are buttressed by injustice). This in turn can open complex re-inhabiting and reshaping of these identity categories as a public form of recognition (e.g. apology) that is commissive and performative (Celermajer, 2006, pp. 174-176). In the case of the roleplay, however, the punitive moralism of the narrative and pedagogical address flattened students’ relationality to the monolithic ascriptive categories of North/South, villain/victim. The sense of shame Heather reports risks falling into self-aggression rather than renovation or reparation (“I felt ashamed that I had ... not [been] someone in deportation”)15.

In a similar way, Siva’s focus on cases of torture, which enhanced the dramatic affective impact of the roleplay, had the consequence of offering only stark abject dichotomies that precluded more nuanced ethical thought.

The group’s pedagogical choices must always be contextualized within the GJE curriculum resources made available within the course. Many of these resources focus on spectacular examples of global injustice as a vehicle to provoking ethical and activist responses amongst students. Influential, too, are anticolonial antiracist models of GJE that mobilize a discourse of liberal guilt. Todd (2003) argues that this discourse positions ‘liberal guilt’ as a suspect response to facing one’s implication in injustice and suffering (p. 95). While anticolonial antiracist educational models mount an important critique of the risks of ahistorical, sentimentalized and romanticized “feeling good about feeling bad” (Simon, 2008), Todd (2003) argues that the pedagogical
consequences of social justice-seeking pedagogies’ distrust of guilt as a self-indulgent, politically ineffective or even paralyzing emotion (“moral catatonia or political indifference” (p. 95)) deserve our reflexive scrutiny. She goes on to ask how the discourse of liberal guilt—conceptualizing student feelings of guilt as an ethically obscene, politically corrosive, embarrassingly petty moral and pedagogical failure in the face of incommensurable injustice and suffering—renders our pedagogy authoritarian and intolerant. How, to return to Britzman, does the ethical urgency of topics such as genocide and historical trauma render too painful our pedagogical contemplation of a range of student responses (including guilt) as the grounds of learning? Indeed, Todd asks what authoritarian impulses underpin social justice educators’ censuring student expressions of guilt (see below, Conclusion).

I need to recognize, then, that the essentialist identity dichotomies circulating within certain discourses that I made available in the course—discourses of antiracism and anticolonial speaking back to Empire—could be recruited to a Manichaeism simplification and dramatic personification of globalization within a punitive model of experiential global justice learning. The instrumental moralism of punitive models of GJE can inspire shame-based theories of social justice learning that preclude a pedagogical curiosity about the ways students resist the authoritarian curricular address: “Even as I tried to remind the ‘tourists’ of what we were doing, they preferred to detach and ‘go shopping’. One participant said quite unabashedly how relieved she was to ‘not be in another group’”(Sandra).

The word “unabashed” indexes a larger discourse of shame (and its opposite, a brazen unconcern for appearances or external judgments). That is, Sandra is concerned by her peer’s resistance of the roleplay’s moral address as a lack of shame.

As Todd (2003) has argued, there are ethical implications for a curriculum whose wishes are so weighed by high ethical or psychic
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TAYLOR

stakes; in ethical terms, she argues, “only responsiveness to the Other [student] can counter the harm wrought by pedagogy’s demands for alteration” (p. 38). But when the stakes of pedagogical success are so high, even as they are pinned on an idealized model of social justice learning as a vehicle of social change, they leave little tolerance or latitude to consider what students might do with that curriculum—the ways they might, for example, refuse liberal jurisprudential discourses of guilt and innocence or ambivalent pedagogical demands for hope or contrition.

The group was adamant when I asked, ‘Where can we find hope?’ There is no hope. I remember one comment: ‘It’s everywhere and it’s never going to end. There is always someone who will get shit on.’ It made me very uncomfortable to know that future teachers will discuss globalization and find no hope ... I struggled ... was I ineffective in addressing the question of hope? Was I not persistent enough? Should I have pushed group members further? Did they even really leave their comfort zone at all? (Siva).

Underlying Siva’s questions—“was I ineffective in addressing the question of hope? Was I not persistent enough?”—is an instrumental approach to moral education as a “problem of knowledge” (Todd, 2003, p. 6) to which her peers’ resistance represents, not the grounds of insight but an impediment to overcome. Such a pedagogy of persuasion dichotomizes student response into measures of pedagogical success or failure. In the spectre of failing (“was I ineffective?”) lies the elemental anxieties of education according to Pitt and Britzman (2003): “insufficiency of knowledge, primal helplessness, and the incapacity to respond adequately. (p. 758)” The ethical potential of the facilitators’ reflections lies in this process of narration. As Todd suggests, questions of ethicality bear less on the evacuation of any interior conflict or tumult
from one’s planning or teaching than in the capacity to recognize and work through these. Put differently, what is at stake ethically for Britzman and Pitt (1996) is not avoiding the destabilization of teachers’ sense of self-coherence and control, but an alertness to one’s familiar strategies of recovering self-mastery (p. 121).

How do we compel students to take up these causes in their lives and our classrooms? ... Perhaps we might find hope in those whose lives we did shake up and change through this activity? Can we satisfy our needs to succeed by telling ourselves that we did make some small difference? And that, really, we can never know the extents of that influence? ... for now, can I, perhaps, release my focus on all that would/should/could be done in terms of the activity, and lamenting the fact that the participants did not live up to my expectations and focus on [developing this activity further]? (Sandra)

Discussing pedagogical efforts to reduce Anne Frank’s diary to a lesson in hope and idealized role model of courage, Britzman (2000) argues that such redemptive pedagogies are “rescue phantasies”, imaginary actions that defend against and displace the “traumatic perception of loss and helplessness” (pp. 34-37). Rescue fantasies can be a melancholic response to loss, she argues, whether loss of a specific love object, of the intact sense of self or one’s faith in human community (an idea foundational to the educational dream of building a more just society) (pp. 33-34). Sandra’s question, “Can we satisfy our needs to succeed?” is of particular interest to my pedagogical goal that the exercise of narrating one’s own difficulties responding pedagogically to difficult knowledge serve students as an opportunity to observe the psychic conditions of one’s loaded attempts at learning (Britzman & Pitt, 1996, p. 119). In articulating the wish their curriculum articulates, Sandra’s reflection raises the question: were their peers to “take up these causes in their
lives and our classrooms” and to become activist GJE teachers participating in challenging global injustice, what might be rescued from all that had been lost in the group members’ encounter with the film? If narration allows one to recognize that “In retrospect I was saying that to comfort myself” (Ann), what other pedagogical decisions might one examine for their impulse to seek psychic comfort or consolation?

**Moments of Self-Observation in Narrative Working Through**

While much of my analysis above is qualitatively speculative, what is of particular interest to me in these writing samples are the kinds of self-observation that can emerge within a teacher education curriculum that asks students to approach the space of difference as a resource for interpretation and insight (Ellsworth, 1997, p. 42) through dialogue and written reflection.

The last component of the course assignment—recounting and asking questions of the teaching experience—was designed specifically with the aim of creating a individual and dialogic process for inquiring into and learning from the complexity of response (the teacher’s and students’). The design takes up Britzman’s argument that “[t]o study the difficulty of others is actually to study how one comes to relate to the conditions of difficulty expressed, as opposed to somehow attempt to reacquire the felt experience of the other” (Britzman, 2000, p. 38). That is, studying the impact of global injustice on distant others was staged in this exercise as a struggle with one’s response to the difficult knowledge this representation triggers. In this, there lies the possibility of learning from one’s responses as a habit of reflection in learning.

In this exercise, some of the facilitating students probed and questioned the most fundamental dynamics and learning theories underpinning their curriculum design and practice. Several students asked how their own needs were structuring and driving their
pedagogy: “Can we satisfy our needs to succeed by telling ourselves that we did make some small difference? And that really, we can never know the extents of that influence?” (Sandra). While her questions are unanswerable, asking them pricks a curiosity about the stories we tell ourselves and how these stories are structured by unrecognized needs. While these needs can never be expunged, giving them language does open avenues into new forms of thought that might be brought to bear upon one’s frames of perception, judgment and action (Butler, 2009; Simon, 2011; Bennett, 2005).

Learning to tolerate Loss in/as Learning

Considering the breakdown of their pedagogical desire—it’s insufficiency to rescue them from the infinite obligation and susceptibility they experienced viewing Life and Debt—appears to have returned certain students to the ethical challenge of constructing forms of self-knowledge and ethical relationality as an unending labour of response and a haunting in their immediate lives:

[Afterwards] I remember a hollow feeling when I asked whether there’s any hope in all of this. I suddenly felt like the effects of globalization were in the midst of our own classroom and that although we, as teachers, are supposed to have the power to change things, I felt completely powerless. I felt empty inside like this huge problem was staring me in the face and I couldn’t respond (Ann).

For Ann, seeking to understand her peers’ resistance meant facing once again the crisis of witnessing her own limitation, returning to the task of working through these dynamics of vulnerability, inadequacy and loss. Lost in particular was the redemptive fantasy that “we, as teachers, are supposed to have the power to change things”, a fantasy that had driven the euphoria of the group’s planning and the disillusion of tolerating
their peers’ response. There is, she notes, a vacuum she experiences in facing the devastating “effects of globalization” neither as a discrete object of study nor as a problem resolvable through instrumental teleologies of knowledge acquisition, but as an immediate presence “in the midst of our own classroom.” This immediacy is a Levinasian call that obliges and makes demands of me infinitely beyond my capacity (Todd, 2003, pp. 29-30). This disillusion opens the portal into thinking (Pitt, 2003, p. 91), but also the interminable labour of response (Butler, 2009; Ellsworth, 2005; Todd, 2009).

Indeed, I find most interesting the possibility that, in designing the roleplay with the hope “to reflect the emotions I felt underlying the guilt when I watched the film” (Heather), the group created an opportunity for their peers not to experience their construction of Jamaicans’ global subalternization but rather their own sense of loss and infinite obligation that haunt the task of inheriting the urgent weight of our world (Simon, 2011).

This speculation is prompted by reconsidering Siva’s use of Amnesty case studies through the lens of Ellsworth’s writing on the pedagogy of certain commemorative spaces. Ellsworth (2005) identifies a particular structure of address in these spaces, one conditioned by an understanding of responsibility as a form of ethical learning (p. 112).

Ellsworth is interested in the forms of ethical learning that can emerge from the “psychic split in the learning self”. Describing the pedagogical address of the Ringelblum Milk Can16 in the Washington Holocaust exhibit, she identifies the “moment that inaugurates the split between the self who is held hostage to the moral imperative of the museum and the self who walks away” (Ellsworth, 2005, p. 110). This split inaugurates an interminable haunting, she argues, referencing Muschamp’s account of visiting the Dachau concentration camp: “You walk into the daylight, but part of you does not leave. The doorway divides you … A moral universe could arise from the imperative to
answer the self we left behind” (Muschamp in Ellsworth, 2005, p. 111). It is the self who “remains behind, wondering how, since no one deserved to die here, we deserve to leave” that haunts the self that leaves, posits Ellsworth (2005), the captive self whose ethical questions can never be satisfied (p. 111).

Ellsworth (2005) argues that the pedagogical address of the exhibit’s inescapable moral call “does not teach me a prescribed responsibility; rather, it stages responsibility as an indeterminate and interminable labor of response … [one that] can only take place in the space of difference between the self who is held hostage to an imperative and the self who is free to step out into daylight” (p. 112). Like Butler’s sense of precarity/responsiveness, like Todd’s sense of humanity forged from the trauma of intersubjective proximity, the sense of responsibility Ellsworth describes is neither a pre-determined (or determinable) experience nor a pre-defined lesson. Rather, it is a structure of address and a mode of relationality that can only erupt spontaneously from the conditions of a particular encounter (Todd, 2003, p. 49).

The haunting theorized by Ellsworth resonates with the hollowness Ann describes as she is forced to witness the proximity of globalization’s apparently distant and abstract violence in her classroom and in particular in her peer’s apparent failure to learn or feel what she had hoped. Ellsworth’s image of the structure of responsibility staged by the “self we left behind” raises for me the possibility that Siva’s activity aims not to persuade nor replicate a predetermined experience of incarceration but, rather, to point to a certain quality of attention and ethical relationality structured by a split and haunted imaginary.

Reconsidering the structure of address in Siva’s pedagogy prompts me to wonder if the roleplay’s design aimed to allow the Other to occupy a testimonial place within the learning self (Todd, 2003, p. 45). Did it seek to allow for a form of knowledge that is other to the sensate regimes posited by Butler to haunt our learning selves in this exercise? Does this
position knowledge in ways other than as an object of instrumental consumption? This is not to lose sight of the freighted conditions of learning. Did the psychic and ethical stakes of pedagogically responding to the concrete horror of torture intensify a curricular wish into a demand and render the “space of difference” too painful for facilitators to consider as the grounds of student and teacher insight?

Conclusion

The quotes from facilitators’ reflections might be read as a tentative practice of narrative working through the dynamics of aggression and loss that haunt their attempts to make a relation to the difficult knowledge of globalization’s ravages. Beyond this, however, is the attempt to make pedagogical sense of this relation. These excerpts tell the story of the facilitators’ experience of being affected, first, by the terrible knowledge of their research into globalization and, second, by the responses of their peers to this research in the format they presented it. The structure of the course activity asked facilitating students to articulate their experiences of breakdown in the face of their peers’ responses to a curriculum of difficult knowledge that bore the turbulence of their own ongoing working through this same knowledge. This exercise in articulating, interpreting, symbolizing and deliberating on the experience of breakdown in teaching is part of the labour of working through, remaking meaning and remaking the self (in relation to others) in ways more resilient, less reactive and more interested in the insights student responses offer.

Affect is not emotion, however, but a defence. Nor is its relation to thought straightforward in any way that might be instrumentalized within teleological, redemptive pedagogical agendas of attitudinal change and knowledge accumulation. The rich stories of loss, attachment and transference told by the students in this course alert us to some of
the psychic dynamics operative in teaching about social injustice. They suggest the kinds of affect these facilitators brought to their curriculum planning, the kinds of affect they tried to mobilize in their pedagogy (Butler’s epistemological question) and the possibilities for such affect to lead to ethical and political judgment and practice (Butler’s ethical question). In demanding that they observe the breakdown of their desires and the fragile meanings they had constructed from representations of global injustice, the exercise asked them to consider the bounds of the thinkable upon which they stake their sense of self as a good global citizen—but also their sense of self as a teacher (and global justice educator).

These narratives of facilitators’ struggles to respond to knowledge of the increasing extremes of precarity and suffering generated by a global order in which we are all implicated as learners and teachers speak to the original premise of this article that the particular stakes and qualities of global justice teacher education demand an attention to the pedagogical and ethical implications of learning as a psychic event. At a granular level, their reflections attest to the dual high stakes-fueled dynamics that weigh heavily upon global justice education and render it difficult in particular ways. On the one hand, there are the psychic conflict, urgencies and anxieties of teachers’ ongoing response to a painful recognition of the incommensurable injustice to be addressed; and, on the other hand, are discourses and models of teaching / learning that come to frame teachers’ response as resources for constructing a sense of hope and resolution. Taking these difficult qualities seriously reframes learning in global justice teacher education as an exercise in cultivating tools to learn from the conditions of one’s activist commitments and passionate encounters with difficult knowledge (both knowledge of the implacable urgency of our mandate to respond to this world and knowledge of our students’ uncertain and resistant responses to our pedagogical efforts). It asks what language and learning relationships
might support preservice teachers’ bringing these observations into the realm of narration, dialogue and ethical deliberation. In their design of the exercise, the facilitators came face-to-face with the crisis of representation that failed to deliver the kinds of knowledge, affect or experiences they themselves had found politically effective in their own process of research. Several facilitators also came to observe and question the ways their own inner psychic crises of response to knowledge of the ravages of globalization shaped both the demand underpinning their teaching and their capacity to tolerate their peers’ response to that demand.

The difficult qualities of GJE observed in my analysis above have ethical implications for the teaching/learning relationship, how it is imagined and tolerated. Learning to teach passionately for social and global justice might, as Britzman (2007) has suggested, consist simply in learning to tolerate thinking about the emotional qualities of the experience of teaching (pp. 8-9). This includes tolerating both the urgency and inadequacy of one’s response, tolerating the uncertainties of students’ responses that seem to betray the anxieties and wishes one has yet to acknowledge, and tolerating the loss of mastery and hope. These are the forms of vigilance and habits of tolerance I hope might emerge from spaces of observation and reflection supported by the course pedagogy.

Attending to the “faultlines in student narratives” (Britzman, 2009, p. 120) has alerted me that the difficult qualities of global justice education I identify in the introduction condition my own conduct of global justice teacher education. Observing the pedagogical models (e.g. experiential and simulation-based, persuasive knowledge-based pedagogies) to which my students turned in seeking to make pedagogical sense of their own encounter with the difficult knowledge of globalization prompts me to scrutinize the wishes and discursive regimes structuring my own
teaching address, the resources and other curricular objects I make available to students, as well as the work these might short-circuit in their offer of authoritative, consolatory meanings. If this is a story of aggression triggered by a sense of loss, as a pedagogue I must face the possibility the facilitators’ response to that loss was channeled by particular theories of experiential learning, knowledge-based instrumentalized moral instruction and redemptive approaches to GCE and GJE that were made available within the course curriculum and pedagogical address. Listening to the aggression facilitators articulated towards their peers’ resistant learning returns me to the dichotomies and punitive ascriptive categories mobilized within the anticolonial and antiracist discourses underpinning my own teaching commitments.

Of concern to Todd (2003) is a lack of precision not only in the ascriptive identity categories mobilized in SJE but also in the conceptualization of guilt as a response to the difficult knowledge of one’s implication in another’s suffering (pp. 95-97). She discerns a “moralizing rubric” in the discourse of “liberal guilt” that condemns all student expressions of guilt (a form of emotional suffering) as, at best, petty, apolitical self-pity insufficient to ground political analysis/action and, at worst, a form of moral failure or even defensive resistance (Todd, 2003, p. 96). In Todd’s argument, the imprecision and moralistic tones of this discourse have ethical implications for our conduct and reflexivity in our own pedagogy. Firstly, they censor or render suspect (and subject to pedagogical surveillance and discipline) all student expressions of painful emotions in response to the representations of suffering in our curriculum. They also preclude our scrutinizing the wishes, demands and models of learning underpinning our own pedagogy that elicits such responses. The “illocutionary dismissiveness” (Todd, 2003, p. 97) of this discourse thus impedes our reflexivity and assumption of pedagogical responsibility for the demands and burdens to which we subject our students and the emotional responses we elicit. It cuts short our ethical
deliberation on the ways an intolerance of guilty expressions can defend us from loss and self-implication, how it can become a practice of negation, intolerance and disassociation that displaces our inner crises onto a tyrannical pedagogical relation (Britzman & Pitt, 2006, p. 122; Sandlos, 2009, p. 67).

My analysis of student writing above suggests global justice educators would do well to examine the inherent paradoxes of our agendas. Let us recognize what we’re aiming for in SJE, that is, to render students susceptible to the lives of those rendered unrecognizable within contemporary frames of war and to support students in their attempt to symbolize this susceptibility, to bring it into the realm of ethical thought as a relation of ethical implication and social responsibility (Todd, 2003, p. 93). This recognition needs to be informed by an understanding that susceptibility triggers defences, transference and other responses to the loss of self-mastery, coherence and stability. There is no straight path into responsibility. We need a greater attention to the work of emotional labour in our students’ learning to make a relation to loss when this loss is a response to the susceptibility our pedagogy aims to foster.

The reflections above paint the space of difference in my and my students’ pedagogy as an agonistic one carved out by “the interplay between what we do know (or think we know) and what we don’t know or don’t want to know, and what we desire of and for ourselves and accept as our responsibilities” (Simon, forthcomingB). Implicit to my analysis is a call for a pedagogy of responsiveness. Such a pedagogy might ask teachers to learn to tolerate proximity—both to urgent issues of this “sustaining and impinging world” (Butler, 2009, p. 37) and to their students—as an exercise in forging a language and strategies to build humane relations within the volatility of engaged teaching. This is the labour of implicating oneself in the inheritance of a violent world and one’s own violent responses to it (Arendt, 1961, p. 196).
Notes

1 Britzman (1998) follows Freud in distinguishing ‘learning about’ and ‘learning from’: “[w]hereas learning about an event or experience focuses on the acquisition of qualities, attributes, and facts, so that it presupposes a distance … or… detachment … learning from … is of a different order, that of insight … [it] asks something intimate from the learner.” In this article, I consider learning from to imply a curiosity and self-implication into the dynamics of one’s own learning.

2 Spivak (2010) offered a useful brief gloss of subalternization as referring to those cut off from all social mobility.

3 Butler (2009, p. 25) defines precarity as “the politically induced condition in which certain populations suffer from [extreme degradation as well as] failing social [environmental] and economic networks of support and become differentially exposed to injury, violence, and death.”

4 I distinguish Global Justice Education (GJE) from GCE as a pedagogy emerging, not from citizenship education, but anti-discrimination education, social justice, anticolonial and altermondialist movements; GJE focuses on transnational social solidarity and maintains a critical eye on state-centred constructions of the global citizen or civic actions.

5 The call to global citizenship is commonly taken up through persistent colonial tropes of noblesse oblige and the civilizing mission refashioned as global responsibility and the “desire for development” (Heron, 2007). When pedagogy works against this offer, a profound epistemological and ontological crisis ensues as we encounter “others who are not who we thought they were, are not the image we have constructed of them, are not who we want them to be or hate them to be or need them to be so that we can continue to be who we think we are” (Ellsworth, 2005, p. 89). The crisis in global justice education opens a time and space of epistemological and ontological disorientation between the apprehension
of others “whose differences survive our attempts to deny, change, assimilate, demean … control”, to know, help, rescue or develop them (Ellsworth, 2005, p. 89), and the rushing in of colonial and neo-imperial imaginaries to re-order power relations of knowing and being. The pedagogy of the course under examination is designed to provoke, sustain and ‘hold’ this moment and space of epistemic vertigo, ontological loss and traumatic responsibility from the ego’s self-defence, and to offer learners, not the consolation of familiar imperial hierarchies of knowing, being and feeling, of authority and innocence, but a series of critical tools to respond to this crisis productively (Fitzpatrick, Sandlos & Simon, 2009).

Butler (2009, p. 23) enumerates several frames: “the frame of the photograph, framing of the decision to go to war, framing of immigration issues as a ‘war at home’, framing of sexual and feminist politics in the service of the war effort.”

11.7 per cent of the students in the B. Ed. program are francophone, less than 3 percent are allophone (their first language being neither French nor English), 35.6 per cent are from outside Quebec, and less than 10% are visible minority.

One course text is Hall, 1997.

This is based on Jamaica Kincaid’s (1988) In a Small Place that begins: “If you go to Antigua as a tourist, this is what you will see.”

While I encourage groups to plan independently, available resources included role plays or games designed to concretize or visualize growing global disparities in wealth, late capitalist corporate strategies of labour exploitation, global production strategies by multinational corporations, or World Bank and International Monetary Fund economic restructuring policies; see TDSB, 2007; ReThinking Schools, 2003.

All names are pseudonyms and the year of enrolment has been withheld.
My reformulation of these questions was sharpened by my reading of Matthews, 2009, Sandlos, 2009, and Britzman, 2009.

Identification, argues Britzman (1998), involves the “projection of the self into the conditions of the other” (p. 83), in which empathy depends upon the degree to which the reader would feel or respond the same way to these circumstances; that is, the reader takes the role of “arbitrator and judge of the other’s actions and possibilities.” In other words, there is the illusory sense of having actually felt, experienced or shared another’s pain that can attend such exercises, an imaginative move that Britzman argues is essentially narcissistic and judgmental.

Considering the fraught stakes of different modes of self-recognition, see Sandlos, 2009, p. 65.

Considering dynamics of aggression in teaching and learning, Britzman (1998) reminds us: “[i]nternal conflict does not just vanish. And the placement of it elsewhere—outside the self—only exacerbates the trouble for then, it seems, what is put outside threatens to turn against, and even come aggressively toward, the self” (pp. 125-126).

“Under the leadership of Emmanuel Ringelblum, a university trained historian, several dozen writers, teachers, rabbis, and historians compiled an archive documenting life in the Warsaw ghetto … On the eve of the final annihilation of the ghetto, Ringelblum buried all records and documents in metal containers and milk cans so they would be found after the war, after his death and the death of all other members of his historical society. So they would let the world know” (Wienberg & Elieli, cited in Ellsworth, 2005, pp. 110-111).

Following Massumi, Simon (2011) makes this distinction, qualifying affect as “immediate sensation” uncoded within linguistic systems of meaning.

References


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